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THE POLICING OF DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE
NATION'S CAPITAL: LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL
CORRECTIONS OF A POLICE DEPARTMENT'S
MISCONCEPTION OF MISSION AND
FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP
Ralph Temple*
Congress shall make no law.., abridging.., the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
United States Constitution, First Amendment
I do solemnly swear.., that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true
faith and allegiance to the same ... So help me God.
Oath of Office, D.C. Chief of Police
Ain't it a thing of beauty to see our folks up there ready to go.
D.C. Chief of Police Charles H. Ramsey, admiring columns of his officers on September
27, 2002, as they prepared to arrest four hundred peaceful protesters and bystanders they
had herded into Pershing Park. The Washington Post, Sept. 28, 2002, at B-4, col. 6.
INTRODUCTION

1

In January 2005 two historic reform measures were imposed on the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia to eliminate abuses of the First
Amendment rights of demonstrators in the nation's capital that had persisted for
almost four decades. The first, on January 24, 2005, was the consent order in an
* Ralph Temple, a Washington D.C. trial lawyer, served as legal director of the American Civil
Liberties Union of the National Capital Area from 1966 to 1980, and taught at the law schools of
Harvard University (1958-59), George Washington University (1959-62), Georgetown University
(1975), and Howard University(1969-70). Professor Will McLain of the University of the District of
Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law, Arthur Spitzer, Legal Director of the American Civil
Liberties Union of the National Capital Area, and Henry Gassner, Editor-in-Chief, UDC/DCSL L.
Rev., made substantial contributions of research and editing to this article.
1 An earlier version of this article was presented in December 2003, as a report of the American
Civil Liberties Union of the National Capital Area, at hearings of the Judiciary Committee of the
District of Columbia Council. Many of the recommendations of that report were incorporated in the
First Amendment Rights and Police Standards Act of 2004, enacted by the D.C. Council on Jan. 26,
2005, which is discussed in Part IV of this article and included as an appendix.
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American Civil Liberties Union lawsuit, Abbate v. Ramsey, No. 03-CV-0767
(D.D.C.), 2 proscribing certain police practices and placing the Department under
the Court's jurisdiction for three years to ensure compliance. The second was the
enactment by the District of Columbia Council of the First Amendment Rights
and Police Standards Act of 2004, prohibiting specific police abuses. The new law
which, on the January 26, 2005 deadline, Mayor Anthony Williams neither signed
nor vetoed, must still withstand review by the United States Congress. This article documents the history of police abuses which culminated in these actions of
judicial and legislative intervention and describes the restraints these interventions place on police practices.
America has a rich tradition of protest demonstrations which have served as a
major instrument of non-violent political and social reform. 3 No twentieth century nation has been as successful as the United States in harmonizing so ethnically, racially and politically diverse a population with so little violence. The
transformational power of mass protests has played a major role in that history.
The American labor movement of the 1920s and 30s, the anti-Vietnam War
movement of the 1960s and '70s, and the 1960s civil rights movement are the
most outstanding examples of social revolutions without major bloodshed. That is
why Justice Thurgood Marshall argued passionately for preserving sites in Washington, D.C. as the traditional place of "some of the most rousing political demonstrations in the Nation's history.",4 Police flouting of the First Amendment
rights of speech and assembly not only undermines the rule of law, it subverts a
vital mechanism of our democracy.
The Metropolitan Police Department (M.P.D.) of the District of Columbia has
efficiently and professionally handled numerous mass demonstrations in the nation's capital. Yet the Department has repeatedly failed in handling demonstrations at which significant numbers of arrests were anticipated. In the last fifty
5
years, there have been three major periods of mass arrests: the April 1968 riots,
the 1969 to 1971 anti-Vietnam War demonstrations, 6 and the April 2000 to present anti-globalization demonstrations. 7 In each of these periods, the police engaged in indiscriminate arrests, unwarranted assaults with clubs and gas, and
unlawfully prolonged detentions. A major feature of the police actions has been
the failure to record arrest information that would permit the prosecution of
2 Consent Order, Abbate v. Ramsey, 03-CV-767 (Jan. 24, 2005), available at www.dcd.uscourts.
gov/03-767a.pdf.
3 See, e.g., Lucy BARBER, MARCHING ON WASHINGTON: THE FORGING OF AN AMERICAN
TRADITION (2002).

4 Clark v. Committee for Community Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 303 (1984) (dissenting
opinion).
5 See Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
6 See id. at 942.
7 See Part I, Sections B and C of this article, infra.
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rightfully arrested protesters and the discipline of wrongfully acting police officers. The arrests were made, not for criminal prosecution, but solely to clear and
keep people off the streets-an unlawful use of the power of arrest.8
Of course, many large demonstrations have occurred in Washington, D.C.
without any significant problems. Non-problematic demonstrations, conducted
with official sanction and cooperation, such as the Million Man March, 9 the Million Mom March, 10 or the anti-war demonstrations of October 26, 2002,11 and
October 25, 2003,12 posed mainly logistical problems. Peripheral disorders occurred in those, too, but police officers, under orders to do so, were able efficiently to isolate and control those incidents. When properly directed, D.C. police
officers have shown time and again that they can lawfully and professionally handle whatever problems arise. A good example is one of the few problematic demonstrations where the D.C. police excelled-the Ku Klux Klan march down
Pennsylvania Avenue in October 1990.13 The police, under court order to permit
the march, were pelted along the parade route with rocks, bottles, and curses by
enraged crowds from which the officers protected a handful of robed Klan
marchers. It was one of the Metropolitan Police Department's hardest assignments and finest moments.
But virtually all other problematic demonstrations-those in which the sponsors pre-announce civil disobedience, such as traffic blocking, or in which some
factions are bent on vandalism or disorder-have been another matter. It is those
demonstrations that challenge D.C. police management to honor and protect
First Amendment rights of free speech and assembly while maintaining order.
And that is where the leadership of the Metropolitan Police Department
(M.P.D.) has, with rare exception, failed. M.P.D. management has regularly
abused several of its powers in such demonstrations: the parade permit law, the
power of
power of the police to clear an area due to emergency or disorder, the
14
arrest, and the power to detain before presentation to a magistrate.
In the most recent such action, as of this writing, on September 27, 2002, D.C.
police herded over 400 anti-globalization protestors into Pershing Park at 15th
8 See Sullivan, 478 F.2d, at 954-55, 970.
9 Michael Fletcher & Hamil R. Harris, Black Men Jam Mall for a 'Day of Atonement,' WASH.
POST, Oct. 17, 1995, at A-1.
10 Susan Levine, Many Mom's Voices are Heard on Mall, WASH. POST, May 15, 2000, at A-1.
11 Monte Reel & Manny Fernandez, Anti-War Protests Largest Since '60s, WASH. POST, Oct. 27,
2002, at C-1.
12 Eric Lichtblau, Demonstrators Demand U.S. Withdraw Troops from Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
26, 2003, at 20.
13 Mary Jordan & Linda Wheeler, 14 Hurt as Anti-Klan Protestors Clash with Police, WASH.
POST, Oct. 29, 1990, at A-i, A-8.
14 See Section I of this article, infra.
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Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., then enclosed and arrested them. 5 Even
the M.P.D. has acknowledged that these arrests were unlawful. 1 6 Public concern
aroused by these police abuses led to hearings before the D.C. Council Committee on the Judiciary and to the enactment of the First Amendment Rights and
Police Standards Act of 2004.17 In addition, in response to one of the ensuing
lawsuits, Abbate v. Ramsey, i s supra, the District of Columbia accepted a settlement agreement and consent order that included a personal apology by the D.C.
Police Chief, the payment of substantial damages to those arrested, and significant limits on police authority in handling demonstrations.
Part I of this article shows that the abuses of September 27, 2002, which precipitated the legislative hearings and the lawsuit resulting in reform, were not an
isolated incident and that similar abuses occurred during the April 2000 antiglobalization demonstrations. Indeed, these abuses date back to the Vietnam
War, thirty years ago, when the federal courts condemned them and awarded
victimized demonstrators millions of dollars in damages. Part II suggests that civil
disobedience and disruptions during mass demonstrations can be handled within
the bounds of the law. D.C. police supervisors' unlawfulness has been a failure of
will, not necessity. Part III points to the media's unwavering support, until recently, as a major factor in encouraging Metropolitan Police Department management to continue to rely on unlawful methods. Part IV summarizes the
reforms under the Abbate Consent Order and the First Amendment Rights and
Police Standards Act of 2004, with the Act attached as an appendix. These reforms could be a useful model for other jurisdictions throughout the country.
I.

THE HISTORY OF PREEMPTIVE AND BRUTAL

D.C.

POLICE ACTIONS

IN DEMONSTRATIONS

In the April 1968 riots following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr., 6,000 people were arrested and detained in the District over a period of a few
days in the three areas racked by widespread arson, vandalism, and looting.' 9
During the Vietnam War, from the late 1960s to the mid 1970s, there were mass
arrests of antiwar protesters in the District, culminating in the first week of May
1971, during which almost 15,000 people were arrested and preventively de15

Manny Fernandez & David A. Fahrenthold, Police Arrest Hundreds in Protest, WASH. POST,

Sept. 28, 2002, at A-1.
16 Carol D. Leonnig, IMF Arrests Improper Police Found, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2003, at B-2.
17 The legislative history of Bill 15-968 is available at www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us. Its text
is attached to this article as an appendix.
18 Abbate v. Ramsey, No. 03-CV-0767 (D.D.C.), which was filed by the American Civil Liberties Union of the National Capital Area on behalf of seven plaintiffs arrested in Pershing Park, who
were seeking damages and injunctive relief.
19 See WILLIAM DOBROVIR, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF CRISIS, A STAFF REPORT TO THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE UNDER EMERGENCY CONDITIONS (1969), cited in
Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 946 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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tained.2 ° The third period of mass arrests began with the anti-globalization demonstrations of April 2000 and extends to the present. In none of these episodes
were the illegal methods relied upon by D.C. police management necessary.
A.

Riots and Demonstrations,1968-1971

During the 1968 riots, from April 4th to April 8th, the police indiscriminately
swept people off the streets in riot areas, never recording the circumstances and
basis for the arrests.2 1 With the jails overflowing and booking procedures overwhelmed, those arrested, including many innocent people, were held for days
without being brought to the local court-then called the D.C. Court of General
Sessions. When they were brought to court, the judges, in violation of the right to
individual consideration, set across-the-board bail-bonds of $1,000.00 as a way of
keeping people locked up.22 On April 8, 1968, the American Civil Liberties
Union of the National Capital Area challenged the arrests and detentions by filing a lawsuit in federal court against then-Chief Judge Harold Greene and a
dozen of the other judges, the United States Attorney, the Corporation Counsel,
the Chief of Police, and the Director of the Department of Corrections. The suit
was immediately dismissed, but the day it was filed the government began rapidly
freeing people and almost all were out within twenty-four hours.23
Subsequently, a Committee on the Administration of Justice under Emergency
Conditions of the Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that the system of justice had broken down. It recommended that measures be developed and implemented to maintain order within the law, including
the development of rapid field arrest-recording procedures.2 4 The25Metropolitan
Police Department then developed a field arrest form procedure.
From 1969 to 1971, however, during the mass arrests of the Vietnam War, the
Metropolitan Police Department abandoned that procedure and resumed its
practice of sweeping people up indiscriminately and without recording the basis
for arrests. The major events occurred in the first week of May 1971. On Monday,
May 3, 1971, the D.C. police, fearing that 100,000 anti-war protesters would try to
block bridges and intersections, arrested almost 8,000 people in a single day. The
police mass arrest procedures, all over the city, were so indiscriminate that federal employees on their way to work, journalists, attorneys, and other bystanders
were also seized. 26 On Tuesday, May 4th, 3,000 orderly demonstrators were encir20
21
22

Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Id. at 946.
See DOBROVIR, supra note 19.

23

David A. Jewell, Liberty Union's Suit Angers Court, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1968, at A-7.

24
25
26

See DOBROVIR, supra note 19.
See Sullivan, 478 F.2d , at 946.
Id. at 948-50. See also ACLU OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL AREA, MAYDAY 1971: ORDER
WITHOUT LAW (1972). A copy of this eighty page report detailing police actions during the first week
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cled and arrested on 10th Street at the Justice Department for failing to disperse,
despite the fact that the dispersal order was a pretense, since people were not
allowed to leave.2 7 On Wednesday, May 5th, 1,200 people were encircled and
arrested in the same way on the U.S. Capitol steps while listening to a Congressman's speech.28 Of the 14,517 arrests of "Mayweek 1971" there were only 128
convictions after trial on the merits. 29 All the rest were declared "invalid and
unconstitutional. ' 30 Millions of dollars in damages were paid out by the District
of Columbia under court award or settlement.3 1
The first of the police practices that was condemned by the federal courts was
the use of the power of arrest, solely to clear the streets, without attempting to
record information that would justify the arrest. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated:
On May 3, 1971, when Washington, D.C. was confronted with a threat to
bring the orderly conduct of the Federal government to a standstill, the public authorities responded by ordering mass arrests. There was no declaration
of martial law. Yet the procedures for requiring that arrests be accompanied
by some indication of the basis therefore ... were terminated. The innocent
as well as the guilty were in large numbers swept from the streets and
placed in detention facilities ....
[P]olice officials laid primary emphasis upon mass arrests as a means of
clearing the streets. The premise of the legal system, that unlawful arrests
can be avoided, or remedied by holding individual policemen accountable,
evaporated

. .

. This lack of accountability was heightened by the fact that

officers appeared on duty without customary name tags or numbered
badges .... 2

The court declared "as a legal principle corollary to the Fourth Amendment's
protection," that "any arrest that was not accompanied by a contemporaneous
Polaroid photograph and field arrest form executed by one who was in fact the
arresting officer" was "presumptively invalid," with such assumption rebuttable
only by the Government showing probable cause in particular cases.33
In another of its major lawsuits, the ACLU of the National Capital Area
brought a class action suit on behalf of participants, observers, and bystanders at
of May 1971 may be obtained from the ACLU of the National Capital Area (telephone 202-457-

0800).
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

See ACLU, supra note 26, at 23-27.
Id. at 29-34. See also Dellums v. Powellx, 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Sullivan, 478 F.2d, at 942, 956.
Sullivan v. Murphy, 380 F. Supp. 867, 868-69 (D.D.C. 1974).
See, e.g., Dellums, 566 F.2d 167.
Sullivan, 478 F.2d, at 959, 967.
Id. at 967.
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demonstrations occurring from November 1969 through May 1971. 3 ' The complaint alleged that whenever D.C. police deemed it necessary to take law enforcement action during demonstrations, there followed unwarranted dispersals,
indiscriminate arrests, excessive violence, and unduly prolonged and abusive
post-arrest detentions.35 During a three-week trial, plaintiffs presented the testimony of 75 witnesses and over 100 documentary exhibits, including police officials' sworn answers to interrogatories, Metropolitan Police Department General
Orders and other directives, training materials, correspondence regarding complaints, deposition and trial transcripts in this and other demonstration cases, and
36
police department movies of police actions.
After the trial, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
found that M.P.D. management was responsible for consistently unlawful actions
in the demonstrations. 37 The Court concluded, among other things, that on February 19, 1970, in an unnecessary application of the parade permit law, the police
had caused "chaos" by attacking, "stampeding," and arresting orderly demonstrators on Virginia Avenue near the Watergate Apartments:
Although the demonstrators had not sought a parade permit for the
march to the Watergate, notices on campus posted prior to the 19th announced the intended course of the demonstration. The police department
was aware of the proposed activities and in anticipation of difficulties staged
a large number of officers from the Civil Disturbance Unit [CDU] around
the apartment complex....
Most of the persons arrested were not engaged in any unlawful conduct
38

The Court found similarly excessive police actions in the whole series of demonstrations from 1969 to 1971:
[O]fficers of the CDU repeatedly took actions which were unreasonable
and unnecessary in the performance of their duties, including: arresting persons who had not engaged in illegal conduct; excessive use of force; unrestricted and hazardous use of chemical agents (primarily gas); unjustified
maintenance of police lines and initiation of sweeps; failure to give sufficient warning to demonstrators of the establishment of police lines; and re34 Washington Mobilization Comm. v. Cullinane, 400 F. Supp. 186 (D.D.C. 1975), rev'd, 566
F.2d 107, reh'g denied, 566 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977). A majority of five of the nine members of the
full court issued opinions stating that the reversal was erroneous but that there was a new chief of
police, and that the police tactics had already been condemned in Sullivan v. Murphy and other cases,
and were not expected to recur. 566 F.2d 124, 129.
35 Washington Mobilization Comm., 400 F. Supp. at 190.
36 Id. at 191.
37 Id. at 208.
38 Id. at 194, 195.
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fusing to advise arrestees of the charges being placed against them or of
their constitutional rights . ..
The District Court also found that "a pervasive pattern of lack of restraint by
police was discernible from the police films and supported by the testimony of
witnesses"; and that "wanton use of physical force also accompanied the arrests
4°
made on [the George Washington University] campus in the late afternoon."
The Court condemned the excessive use of riot batons, chemical Mace, and
gas. 4 Finally, the Court found unlawful conditions of detention and the denial of
the right to be brought promptly before a judicial officer or released on collateral,42 concluding:
[W]hether the [police] department purposely failed to make ... [sufficient] plans in order to prolong the booking process, thereby keeping the
demonstrators off the streets, [could] not be conclusively determined from
the record. Whatever the motivation, however, the net effect of keeping
persons in detention for such extraordinary long periods of time was
unlawful. 43
The Court issued detailed instructions for the correction of these practices and
policies, including a ban on dispersing demonstrators "unless a breach of the
peace involving a substantial risk of violence has occurred or will occur," a ban
on mass arrests without immediately "recording information necessary to establish probable cause," and directing that a new police manual for handling demonstrations and prompt release of arrestees be prepared and submitted to the court
for approval.44
Those reforms were never carried out. A three-judge panel of the United
States Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's ruling. 4 5 The ACLU challenged the action of the panel, asking the full nine-member U.S. Court of Appeals to rehear the case and to reinstate the District Court's ruling. A majority of
five of the nine judges of the full United States Court of Appeals then issued
opinions stating that the three-judge panel's reversal was wrong, but that, rather
than prolong the litigation, they would deny a rehearing and rely upon the Metropolitan Police Department, which by then had a new chief of police, voluntarily
to change its mass demonstration policies and practices. 6
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Id. at 208.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 198, 204, 213.
Id. at 205-08, 214-15.
Id. at 215.
Id. at 218-19
Washington Mobilization Comm., 566 F.2d at 107 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

46

Washington Mobilization Comm., reh'g denied en banc, 566 F.2d 124, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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Four months later, in January 1978, D.C. police management issued two new
mass arrest manuals which failed to correct, and which indeed perpetuated, the
three principal police practices which had been condemned: (i) arrests without
recording the facts essential to establish probable cause; (ii) the establishment of
"police lines" and the authority to order demonstrators to disperse whenever
there was a "potential" for "large scale unlawful activity" (instead of the constitutional standard of a clear and present danger); and (iii) needless and protracted
booking procedures which assured unduly prolonged detention of those arrested.
On September 10, 1979, John Vanderstar of the law firm of Covington & Burling,
on behalf of the ACLU, wrote to the Corporation Counsel urging that the District require the Metropolitan Police Department to revise its manuals to correct
these three practices.47 The M.P.D. refused to do so.
The U.S. Court of Appeals' reliance on M.P.D. management was a mistake.
Covington and Burling, again acting as volunteer ACLU attorneys, succeeded in
negotiating these reforms into the Abbate Settlement Agreement of January 24,
2005.48 In addition, the District Court's directives for corrective action in the
Washington Mobilization case and the proposals in the Covington & Burling letter of September 10, 1979 provided useful input to the D.C. Council in preparing
the First Amendment Rights and Police Standards Act of 2004, enacted on January 26, 2005. These reforms are discussed infra in Part IV of this article and
included as an appendix.
B.

The April 2000 World Trade Demonstrations

In the current period of mass arrests, beginning with the 1,300 people arrested
in the April 2000 anti-globalization demonstrations and culminating most recently in the September 27, 2002 arrests of 649 protesters,4 9 more than 400 of
them in Pershing Park, the Metropolitan Police Department once more employed
the same illegal methods: unlawful dispersals, arrests, brutality, and prolonged
and abusive detentions. There was one unprecedented and particularly egregious
innovation: the raid on the demonstrators' headquarters under the guise of enforcing the fire code.
1. Unlawful Preemption and Shutting Down the Demonstrators' Center
At the April 2000 demonstrations, Metropolitan Police Department management employed unconstitutional prior restraints in the form of "preemptive"
actions:
47 Letter from John Vanderstar of Covington & Burling to Corporation Counsel Judith Rodgers (Sept. 10, 1979) (on file with the author).
48 Setttlement Agreement, Abbate v. Ramsey, 03-CV-767 (Jan. 24, 2005), available at
www.dcd.uscourts.gov/03-767.pdf.
49 Fernandez & Fahrenthold, supra note 15.
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News report. "In a pre-emptive show of force, the police this morning shut
down the headquarters of protesters... 1150
News report: "All weekend long the police acted sternly and preemptively...
51
making mass arrests of even peaceful marchers.
News report: "[Mayor Anthony Williams] said ...that the mass arrests of
52
peaceful protesters last night were justified as a matter of prudence."
It is a violation of the law for police to act preemptively because they anticipate that demonstrators will at some time later in the day or the weekend attempt
to block traffic. Such action is a "prior restraint," long recognized by the courts as
presumptively unconstitutional. Only when there is a "clear and present danger"-disorder unfolding at that very instant-may the government impose a
prior restraint on free speech activity.53 Yet prior restraint was the policy and
purpose of the September 27th arrests-preventive action because demonstration
sponsors had announced they would block traffic and "shut down the city."
The April 15th Saturday morning raid on the demonstrators' coordinating
center was an unusually blatant and dangerous violation of civil liberties. Arriving with two fire marshals, D.C. police inspected the building, found violations of
the fire code, and proceeded to force two hundred protesters and coordinators
out of the building, confiscate their communications equipment and political paraphernalia, and seal the building. 54 Demonstration coordinators were not allowed back in the building until Monday night, April 17th, after the
demonstrations were over.5 5 Although police officials insisted to the media that
the action was taken solely for the safety of the occupants and not to interfere
with the planned demonstrations, it is obvious that the action was, as the New
York Times accurately characterized it, "preemptive." There were also indications that D.C. undercover police had infiltrated the demonstrators' gatherings to
gain access to the building and seek out the fire code violations that would be the
50
51

John Kifner, Police Move Against Trade Demonstrators, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2000, at 6.
John Kifner & David Sanger, Financial Leaders Meet As Protesters Clog Washington, N.Y.

TIMES, Apr. 17, 2000, at A-1.

52 Id. at A-8.
53 See, e.g., Collins v. Jordan, 110 F.3d 1363, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that San Francisco
police should have recognized that preemptive prevention of a demonstration against the Rodney
King verdict was unconstitutional), based upon, inter alia, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969) (requiring for the banning of a speech in a public forum that it be (1) "directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action" and (2) "likely to produce such action"); Carroll v. Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180-81 (1968) ("Prior restraint upon speech suppresses the precise
freedom which the First Amendment sought to protect against abridgement."); and Kunz v. New
York, 340 US 290, 294 (1951) (holding that disorder in prior public meetings is not sufficient grounds
because "[tihere are appropriate public remedies ...if appellant's speeches should result in disorder
or violence").
54 Kifner, supra note 50.
55 David Montgomery & Neely Tucker, ProtestersLooking to Los Angeles After Detour to D.C.
Court, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2000, at A-14.
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pretext of the raid.56 This unsavory spying is a regression to D.C. police participation in the FBI's unlawful COINTELPRO program of the 1960s and 1970s for
which damages were awarded against the District.57
What was particularly troubling about this violation of the demonstration
coordinators' Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights to freedom from unreasonable
search and confiscation of property and First Amendment rights of speech and
assembly is that it establishes a precedent for taking the same action against any
organization the government chooses to target. The chances are extremely high
that technical fire code violations can be found in any building in the city. Today
it is the anti-globalization movement, but tomorrow it could be the Washington
Post.
2.

Preemptive Encirclement and Arrest

As illustrated in the following New York Times news report, the police tactics
in April 2000 were precisely those for which they have now admitted error in the
September 27, 2002 Pershing Park arrests:
By late evening . . . about 600 people had been arrested. They faced
charges of parading without a permit and possibly obstructing traffic, although the march, under continuous police escort, caused little serious disruption on the city streets as the marchers mainly stayed on sidewalks. The
group of demonstrators had been marching through downtown streetsprogressively blocked off by the police during the day-when they found
themselves blocked, then surrounded by city police officers on a block of
20th Street, between K Street and Pennsylvania Avenue ....
Although the marchers and their supporters on nearby sidewalks
chanted for the police to let them go, Police Chief Ramsey said later that
the crowd had refused police orders to disperse. Reporters who had ob58
served the march had not heard any such order.
In addition, on April 2000, as on September 27, 2002, M.P.D. management's
excuse for arresting orderly demonstrators was the failure to obtain a parade
permit and the failure to obey an order to disperse. But, as recognized by the
District Court in the Washington Mobilization case,5 9 since the purposes of the
parade permit law are to avoid two groups competing for the same spot, and to
provide sufficient notice of a march so there can be police on hand to divert
traffic and maintain order, it is a misuse of that law for the police to escort orderly marchers and divert traffic, then to invoke the parade permit law as a pre56
57
58
59

Id.
Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Kifner, supra note 50.
See supra note 38 and accompanying text with quotation.
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text for preventive arrests. Section 107(f) of the D.C. Council's First Amendment
Rights and Police Standards Act of 2004, discussed infra in Part IV and appended
to this article, is designed to prevent this type of abuse in the future.
3. Police Assaults
Despite the fact that the vast majority of demonstrators were non-violent, the
police were quick to resort to violence, "responding forcefully to any .. .who

defied them," using "pepper spray and what appeared to be a form of anti-riot
gas or smoke grenades and charg[ing] into the protesters beating them with long
sticks."' 60 Police roughed up a plainly identified Washington Post reporter, then
arrested her when she complained, struck an Associated Press radio reporter
from behind, and assaulted non-resisting demonstrators. 6' In one incident, the
police, instead of just removing protesters from the path of a bus, doused them
with pepper spray before dragging them away. 62 Even the inadequate police directives of thirty years ago prohibited such use of chemical agents against "passive crowds or at the scene of a sit-down or arm-lock type of demonstration
where the objective is simply to move a group or effect arrests. ,63
4. Unlawfully Prolonged and Abusive Detention
Despite the minor nature of the charges and despite the fact that there was no
documentation to establish probable cause, arrestees were held for many hours
on buses, without access to food, water, or counsel, and for many more hours
before release. One report presented this perspective:
For [Thies] Broderson, who grew up in Germany, the police tactics-ll
hours in handcuffs for a misdemeanor charge, no food, no water, no access
to a lawyer-were uncomfortable reminders of his nation's past. "It was
real police-state measures.
Not the sort of thing one would expect in the
64
capital of a democracy."
The Police Department has shown itself incapable of self-correction. The District of Columbia Council had ample justification for the corrective measures it
60 Kifner & Sanger, supra note 51.
61 Post PhotographerDetainedby Police, WASH. POST, April 16, 2000, at A-28; Petula Dvorak
& Michael E. Ruane, Police, Protestors Claim Victory; Scattered Scuffles and Arrests Punctuate a
Largely Peaceful Day, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2000, at A-1.
62 Joseph Kahn & John Kifner, World Trade Officials Pledging To Step Up Effort Against
AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2000, at A-1.
63 Metropolitan Police Department General Order, Series 805, No. 1 (December 1, 1971), at 6,
(quoted in Washington Mobilization Committee, 400 F. Supp. at 204).
64 Dvorak & Ruane, supra note 61. On July 27, 2000, the Partnership for Civil Justice filed a
class action suit on behalf of those arrested in the police actions of April 2000, seeking damages and
injunctive relief. As of this writing, that suit, Alliance for Global Justice v. District of Columbia, No.
01-CV-0811 (D.D.C.), is still in litigation.
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has taken in approving the First Amendment Rights and Police Standards Act of
2004, discussed infra in Part IV of this article.
C.

The September 27, 2002 Demonstrations

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 imposed on Washington, D.C. a
new tension and a heightened sense of insecurity that have affected all law enforcement agencies. The invasion and occupation of Iraq and other government
actions following the terrorist attacks have initiated a new wave of protest demonstrations in Washington. As in the Vietnam War protests, law enforcement
agencies have tended to overreact at the expense of First Amendment rights, for
example, by attempting to clamp down on demonstrations in general, and at such
key locations as the White House and the United States Capitol. Such efforts to
restrict the right to assemble were rebuffed by the courts thirty years ago,65 and
once more are being challenged. 66
There are no good reasons for such restrictions because there is no connection
between terrorist attacks and demonstrations. There has never been a life-threatening attack emanating from a protest demonstration in Washington. Nor can
protection against terrorism excuse preemptive, arbitrary, or harsh actions in
handling demonstrations. As detailed in this report, Metropolitan Police Department management consistently resorted to these methods long before there was
any threat of terrorist attacks.
Nothing could more tellingly demonstrate the need for correction of police
policy and practice than the mishandling of the September 27, 2002 demonstrations. The M.P.D. has acknowledged that, on September 27, 2002, its officers
herded over four hundred protesters into Pershing Park at 15th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., then corralled and arrested them, as well as journalists,
legal observers, and passersby caught in the police trap, including a Justice Department lawyer on his way to work.67 Those arrested were treated punitively by
being kept handcuffed on buses for many hours, then held at various police facilities for another twenty hours or more, while handcuffed ankle to opposite
wrist. 68
65 See, e.g., A Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (injunction
against limits on White House area demonstrations); Jeannette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of Capitol
Police, 342 F. Supp. 575 (D.D.C. 1972) (three-judge court), summarily affirmed, 409 U.S. 972 (1972)
(declaring unconstitutional a statute banning demonstrations on Capitol grounds).
66 See, e.g., Lederman v. United States, 291 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (invalidating ban on demonstrations in front of Capitol steps).
67 See Leonnig, supra note 16; Fahrenthold & Nakamura, Doubt Cast on Arrests of IMF Protestors, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2003, at B-1 and B-8.
68 See Prof. Jonathan Turley, Un-American Arrests, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2002, at B-8; Editorial.
Mishandled Mass Arrests, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2003, at A-22.
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Mayor Anthony Williams and Chief of Police Charles H. Ramsey have attempted to rationalize these arrests by "defending" the rank and file police officers who carried out the Chief's policies. They also argue that the police should
not be second-guessed for tough decisions made in the urgency of street
dynamics. Thus, according to Mayor Williams, "It's important . . . to recognize
that when [the police] are on the spot and making very, very difficult decisions,
it's important to back them up."'69 And Chief Ramsey, in a memorandum to the
Mayor recommended that no police official should be disciplined for the mishandling of the September 27th demonstrations because of "good faith" errors during "quickly-evolving events. '70 But it is the Chief and the Mayor, not their
officers, who are principally at fault, and they should not try to hide behind the
rank and file.
Moreover, the Pershing Park arrests were not an on-the-spot police response.
They were a pre-planned maneuver, as is evident from the precise way in which
assembling demonstrators were diverted from Freedom Plaza into Pershing Park,
and in which seventy-five bicycling demonstrators from Union Station were channeled by a heavy police escort into the park. The tactic was part of Chief Ramsey's general policy of preemptive action, as were the prolonged detentions,
designed to prevent those arrested from participating in other demonstration activity that weekend.
The simplicity of the September 27th demonstrations highlights the M.P.D.'s
failure to master the art of maintaining order while obeying the law themselves.
They were dealing with a relatively small demonstration of no more than 2,000,71
unusually light traffic, no violence, virtually no disorder (two smashed windows
and several overturned newspaper boxes), and a police presence at the scene that
"overwhelmed" the demonstrators, enabling police "easily ...to out-number
72
protesters whenever they felt the need.",
Chief Ramsey and his commanders have never had to deal with major disorders like the city-wide riots of 1968 or the massive civil disobedience of Mayweek
1971, in which the Judicial Conference and the courts admonished the police to
do better. Even with the far smaller and less challenging demonstrations of April
2000, and the simple demonstrations of September 2002, M.P.D. management
resorted to preemptive and unrecorded arrests, unnecessary club and gas attacks,
and unlawfully harsh and prolonged detention.

69
70
71
72

David A. Fahrenthold & David Nakamura, supra note 67.
Leonnig, supra note 16.
Fernandez & Fahrenthold, supra note 15.
Id.; Monte Reel, A Day of Tightly Controlled Chaos, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2002, at B-1, B4.
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1. No Justification to Arrest or to Disperse
M.P.D. management's mishandling of the September 27th demonstrations was
far more serious than the mere failure to give a dispersal order and to allow those

in Pershing Park to comply. The protesters were not disorderly or impeding traffic, and there were more than enough police officers on hand to maintain order.
There was no good reason for the police to order them to disperse, let alone

arrest them. They were peaceably assembled in a public park in the nation's capital to petition for a redress of grievances, an exercise of First Amendment rights,
' 73

in the words of the Supreme Court, "in their most pristine and classic form."

In two other incidents that same day, the police also overreacted. One or two

people threw rocks through the windows of a Citibank branch office at K Street
and Vermont Avenue, N.W. But instead of apprehending only the perpetrators,
the police arrested the entire group of 150 demonstrators. A second group of 42
demonstrators was arrested on Connecticut Avenue between K and L Streets,
N.W., apparently because a few of them had been walking in the street rather
than on the sidewalk. These mass arrests were unlawful, inasmuch as hardly any
of the arrestees had violated the74 law. Group guilt and punishment are not the
norm or the law in this country.
The problem can become complicated where a handful of people in the midst
of a crowd of hundreds begin throwing objects at the police. In that circumstance,
it may not be feasible for the police to attempt to penetrate a large crowd to
make arrests. Even then, the group should not be dispersed because of the actions of a few. The police can try to end the disorderly conduct by working with
73 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963). Following the settlement agreement in
Abbate v. Ramsey, supra note 48, discussed in Part IV infra, the M.P.D. is still faced with two additional lawsuits arising from the Pershing Park arrests, Barham v. Ramsey, No. 02-CV-2283 (D.D.C.), a
class action filed by the Partnership for Civil Justice, seeking both damages and injunctive relief, and
Chang v. U.S., No. 02-CV-2010 (D.D.C.) seeking damages for eight of those arrested. In Abbate and
Barham, the district court ruled, 338 F. Supp. 2d 48 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2004), with regard to the
portions of these suits claiming against Assistant Chief Newsham, Chief Ramsey, and Mayor Williams, in their personal capacities, that (i) Newsham does not have qualified immunity for his actions
since "it is clear that the mass arrest in Pershing Park ran afoul of the First and Fourth Amendment
constitutional protections" and that "no reasonable police officer could claim to be unaware" of this,
id. at 58-59; (ii) Ramsey does not have qualified immunity with respect to the Pershing Park arrests
since his "reliance on ...Newsham's on-scene report does not excuse.., approval of unlawful arrests,
and does not rise to the level of investigation that ... the situation warranted," id. at 61; (iii) the
Mayor has qualified immunity since he "had reason to believe his subordinates would comply with
federal law and MPD policies," id. at 65; and (iv) Ramsey and the Mayor are not personally liable
with respect to the claims for excessive force or length of detention, id. at 66-70. Litigation with
respect to Barham and Chang is continuing.
74 Reel, supra, note 72, at B-1. The ACLU of the National Capital Area has filed a class action
lawsuit on behalf of these two groups of arrestees, Burgin v. District of Columbia, No. 03-CV-2005
(D.D.C.) (filed September 26, 2003). This suit has been certified as a class action and discovery is
underway as of this writing.
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the demonstrators' representatives on the scene, if any, or by bull-horn admonitions. Failing that, it is usually a better policy for the police to wait out limited
object-throwing, under the protection of their riot gear and shields, rather than to
disperse a large group because of the violence of a few. Only if a significant proportion of a group becomes disorderly are dispersal and arrests appropriate.
These mass arrests of nearly 200 additional people were another instance of
the D.C. police overreacting in circumstances where they were well in control and
could have managed the incident without arresting innocent demonstrators.
2.

Unlawful Use of Arrest and Detention Just to Clear the Streets

The arrests of September 27, 2002 were also unlawful and lacking in good faith
because no effort was made to record the name of each arresting officer who
could testify to a particular individual's violation of the law. The only lawful basis
for arrests is to charge and prosecute those arrested. Because it is virtually impossible to show probable cause without such a contemporaneous record, 75 and because there were no exigent circumstances preventing such recording of the
approximately 400 arrests, it is clear that the police made such arrests with no
intention of establishing probable cause.
The failure to create such records has an additional serious consequence: if
there were some demonstrators who did break the law, they also could not be
prosecuted because there was no way to establish their guilt. The District's taxpayers will ultimately have to pay them compensation for false arrest, even if
their arrests were proper, because of the decision by M.P.D. management to
dispense with lawful arrest procedures. This costly police abuse has now been
banned by both the Abbate Settlement Agreement 76 and Consent Order, 77 and
by section 110 of the First Amendment Rights and Police Standards Act of 2004,
both of which are discussed in Part IV infra.
3. Police Assaults
D.C. police were also accused of unjustifiably beating and pepper spraying
protesters and onlookers,78 and an investigation of police violence was demanded
by a law professor. 79 We know of no instance in which M.P.D. management has
formally held an officer accountable for an unwarranted assault in a
demonstration.
75 As noted in the text accompanying footnote 33, in Sullivan, 478 F.2d at 967, the court held
that arrests without contemporaneous field arrest forms executed by the actual arresting officer were
"presumptively invalid," a presumption rebuttable only by the Government showing probable cause
in a particular case.
76 Supra note 48.
77 Supra note 2.
78 Fernandez & Fahrenthold, supra note 15.
79 Prof. Jonathan Turley, supra note 68.
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4. Unlawfully Prolonged and Abusive Detention
For such minor charges as parading without a permit and failure to obey an
officer-even if the charges had been documented, which they weren't-those
arrested should have been promptly released on citation. Instead they were held
for periods exceeding twenty-four hours. But these arrests, unlawful at their inception, were never intended to comply with law. The detentions were prolonged
solely for the purpose of removing people from the streets and keeping them
from participating in demonstrations. Chief Ramsey told The Washington Post,
"These people that are apprehended are going to miss several protests because
they'll be behind bars."8 0 Watching the arrests of the demonstrators in Pershing
Park, the Chief attempted to justify his preventive action by saying that if people
were allowed to leave the police encirclement, "they leave here and go someplace
else and do something else." 81
The conditions in which people were held were abusive and unlawful. The punitive intention of M.P.D. management is exposed by the decision to cuff those
detained, ankle to opposite wrist, for many long hours. This particular violation
stands out for its cruelty. The First Amendment Rights and Police Standards Act
of 2004, discussed infra in Part IV and appended to this article, seeks in sections
111, 112, and 113 to remedy the chronic abuses of prolonged and oppressive detentions, as does the Abbate Consent Order.
H.
A.

A

FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP

Misconception of Mission

The police wrongdoings of September 27, 2002, like those of April 2000, are
failures of leadership. M.P.D. management misconceive their mission as keeping
the traffic moving at all costs. That is not the mission. The police have their powers for the purpose of upholding the law, and the highest law they are sworn to
uphold is the United States Constitution. When M.P.D. management direct and
permit officers to act outside the law, they impose upon their officers the attributes of a uniformed and armed street gang, diminishing them and undermining
the rule of law.
It is clear that M.P.D. management were deeply affected by the disorders that
attended some-but not all-of the anti-globalization demonstrations in Seattle
from November 30 to December 2, 1999. As a result, they became determined
not to permit another "Seattle" in Washington, D.C. That, in itself, is a legitimate
goal. However, resorting to lawless police measures to prevent another Seattle
was a drastic mistake. Seattle was not a catastrophe that warranted the suspen80 Monte Reel & Manny Fernandez, Police, Protesters In D.C. Prepare For Day of Disruption,
WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2002, at B-1.
81 Reel, supra note 72, at B-1, B-4.
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sion of the Constitution in the nation's capital. Moreover, the First Amendment
aspects of even the Seattle episode had major beneficial repercussions, raising
American and international consciousness about world trade issues and changing
the political and economic agendas of the world trade organizations. Demonstrators should be stopped from blocking traffic and building entrances if possible.
Compliance with constitutional rights and the law may require the police to take
more time and care in their actions, so that there may be some temporary blockages. Such disruptions, if any, are not as socially destructive as the damage done
to the Constitution and to the rule of law by unlawful police actions.
The challenge posed by large groups assembling in Washington, D.C., especially when civil disobedience is likely to occur, is great. But, as the United States
District Court stated in 1975 in the Washington Mobilization case, "the police
may not simply claim exasperation at the enormity of the task and defer constitu' 82
tional precepts to convenience.
B.

Misdirection, Misrepresentation and Cover-Up

1. Misdirection
The cop on the street in a demonstration has a tremendously challenging job.
He or she must be ready to take action to suppress disorder and to subdue violence. Most D.C. police officers are up to these tasks. They have the quickness of
mind and reaction, the physical stamina and strength, and the resolution and
courage to deal with the challenges. They also have the toughness of mind, if
called upon, to handle the hardest part of the job, the part on which they most
need training, encouragement, and support: the ability not to overreact, not to
have hair-trigger nerves, and to remain cool, disciplined, and restrained in the
face of stress and provocation. But D.C. police officers are not called upon to
utilize these skills and, indeed, efforts to do so are undermined by M.P.D.
supervisors.
Police management set the tone and the atmosphere, and when the Chief of
Police displays a willingness to disregard the law, to confront and arrest peaceful
protesters, to misrepresent and cover up mistakes and violations of proper procedures, it has a powerfully corrupting effect on the entire police force. The
Mayor's support of such actions by the Police Chief further undermines the professionalism of the force.
Chief Ramsey, in preparation for problematic demonstrations, bought into the
rhetoric of some of the demonstration sponsors by emphasizing that some were
threatening to "shut down the city" or to "take over the city." The Chief at first
defended the September 27th Pershing Park arrests on the grounds that "[t]hey
82

Washington Mobilization Committee v. Cullinane, 400 F. Supp. 186, 217 (D.D.C. 1975).
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the city, and then turn around
can't come here and say they're going to shut 8down
3
to."
allowed
not
they're
when
angry
and get
It is neither disciplined nor strategic to take such rhetoric at face value and to
treat the demonstrations, as did the Chief, as a confrontation and a contest of
wills. Rather, mass demonstrations must be dealt with as what they actually area complex dynamic involving many different groups engaged in a wide variety of
actions which require specific, measured, and discerning responses to specific behavior. But the Chief's message to the force was: it's us against them. This in turn
led to an aggressive and militaristic presentation to the demonstrators, regardless
of their demeanor, as in this description of D.C. police at the April 2000 demonstrations: "Lines of police officers in riot helmets stamped their feet rhythmically
and pumped their nightsticks in front of their chests as they moved in on the
84
protesters."
This perspective also explains the Chief's satisfaction soon after the unlawful
Pershing Park arrests when he said, "a lot of the wind was taken out of their sails
Friday."'85 This undisciplined and unwise mind-set is the cause of the needless
arrests and assaults on non-lawbreaking demonstrators, and the harsh and prolonged post-arrest detention that have characterized M.P.D. management's
actions.
Ironically, these unlawful methods did not even yield the benefit of keeping
the city fully functioning. Police barricaded and closed off central downtown areas, got the Transit Authority to close several central subway stops, and advised
federal employees and motorists to stay off the streets. As a result, in April 2000
and September 2002, most federal employees did not come into work on demonstration days, traffic was remarkably light even in rush hours, many downtown
businesses closed, and "[p]arts of the downtown corridor appeared largely abandoned by the usual crowds, given over to police and chanting protesters. '86 In a
sense, the Metropolitan Police Department itself became the instrument of those
demonstration sponsors who called for "shutting down" the city.
The message which the leadership communicated to the men and women of
the police force should have been something like: Some demonstration sponsors
are calling for the blocking of traffic and buildings-ourjob is to stop them from
doing that and we will. But at the same time many demonstrators will be orderly
and it is criticalthat we fully protect their right to assemble and protest. We must
not let the need to deal with violators cause us to act against innocents in the vicinity. That is the real challenge to us this weekend.
83

Did D.C. Police Go Too Far?, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2002, at B-1, B-4.

84 Kifner, supra note 50.
85 Manny Fernanadez & Monte Reel, Against War, A Peaceful March, WASH. POST, Sept. 30,
2002, at B-i, B-5.
86

Fernandez & Fahrenthold, supra note 15.
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However, for problematic demonstrations, M.P.D. supervisors have habitually
provided the force with poor training, poor supervision, and poor attitude. In
addition, police officials personally engaging in public misconduct have provided
bad role models for the rank and file. For example, in April 2000, Assistant Chief
Terrance W. Gainer on one occasion directed his officers to point their gas
launchers directly at demonstrators.8 7 On other occasions, when police officers
confronting protesters removed their badges in violation of department policy-a
about to ensue 88 _
form of cover-up to escape accountability for wrongdoings
89
it.
Assistant Chief Gainer and Chief Ramsey condoned
2.

Misrepresentation and Cover-Up

Another form of cover-up was the misrepresentations of police officials when
they raided and closed down the demonstrators' communications center on April
15, 2000, seizing their computers, political props, and handouts. Chief Ramsey
and Assistant Chief Gainer told the press it was solely because of fire hazards and
a concern for the safety of those in the center. 90 This was no less a lie just because
it was an obvious lie.
Nor is Chief Ramsey embarrassed by resorting to fanciful excuses for disregarding criminal behavior by his officers. When asked about police clubbing nonviolent demonstrators, the Chief responded that it might have been done by demonstrators dressed up as officers. 91
More recently, Chief Ramsey repeatedly insisted that an order to disperse was
given to the demonstrators arrested in Pershing Park on September 27, 2002,
even though he had secretly acknowledged in a March 13, 2003 memorandum to
the Mayor that no such order had been given. 92 The Mayor's aides told reporters
that the Metropolitan Police Department's Internal Affairs Report about the
Pershing Park arrests could not be released because it contained confidential inreport, in fact,
formation concerning the discipline of certain police officials. The
93
lie.
a
was
too,
this,
so
discipline;
regarding
contained nothing
It is rare for the Department to admit error, and left to its own devices it is
unlikely that this internal investigation and report would ever have come into
being, particularly because the preemptive arrests of the Pershing Park protesters
were carried out pursuant to a policy and practice that Chief Ramsey had imple87 Dvorak & Ruane, supra note 61, at A-1, A-6.
88 See Sullivan, 478 F.2d at 967.
89 Dvorak & Ruane, supra note 61, at A-6; Steve Twomey, Businesses Lock Up, Batten Down
For Protests, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2000, at A-12; David Montgomery, Protests End With Voluntary
Arrests, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2000, at A-1, A-17.
90 Kifner, supra note 50.
91 David Montgomery, IMF Meets During Standoff, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2000, at A-1, A-7.
92 Leonnig, supra note 16.
93 Id.
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mented in the April 2000 arrests. It was only because of the persistent demands
of D.C. Council Judiciary Committee Chair Kathy Patterson upon the Mayor that
the Department ultimately was forced to conduct a real investigation and prepare
a report. And even then, the Police Department's admission that the Pershing
Park arrests were unlawful would never have been made public, and Chief Ramsey's misrepresentation would not have been exposed, if a federal judge had not
ordered the report released. 94
3.

Lack of Accountability

Metropolitan Police Department management have historically been unwilling
to hold police officers accountable for wrongful conduct in demonstrations, no
matter how plain the wrongdoing or how severe the consequences. For example,
the only discipline that ensued from the Pershing Park arrests was a slap on the
wrist in the form of a "minor reprimand" to Assistant Chief Peter Newsham who
had ordered the arrests without justification and in violation of the First Amendment, the laws against wrongful arrest, and police department procedures. 95 He
caused over 400 people to be arrested, handcuffed, separated from their property,
and confined under harsh conditions for periods exceeding twenty-four hours,
and his only discipline was a reprimand. Discipline should be more commensurate with the magnitude of the wrong committed and the suffering caused. Even
the minor reprimand would not have occurred if the Mayor had not overruled
Chief Ramsey, who recommended that there be no discipline at all.96 On the
other hand, it might have been unfair to really discipline Assistant Chief Newsham, since it appears that he was following Chief Ramsey's orders and was taking the blame to cover for the Chief.
Apart from Mr. Newsham, we know of no police officer being formally disciplined for any of the incidents in the demonstrations of April 2000 and September 2002. This is not surprising in light of Chief Ramsey's public clash with the
Mayor on the subject. Following the April 2000 demonstrations, the Mayor announced: "The chief has stated.., that all complaints are going to be investigated
immediately and taken seriously... I think this police department has shown the
ability to investigate itself and police itself well."'97 Later that day, when told
what the Mayor had said, Chief Ramsey responded: "Unless there is overwhelming evidence that an officer physically abused someone, I intend to give them all
medals, not discipline, because they did a good job." 98
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Kathryn Sinzinger, Patterson, Graham Seek MPD Inquiry,
24, 2000, at 1, 8.
98 Id.
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It is extraordinary that a police chief would (i) prejudge complaints before
they are considered, (ii) exclude consideration of all complaints other than those
of physical abuse, and (iii) impose an unlawfully difficult standard for complainants to meet, namely "overwhelming evidence." This unwillingness to hold officers accountable is longstanding. In the Washington Mobilization case in which
the United States District Court found numerous instances of intentionally unlawful arrests and assaults on demonstrators in a series of demonstrations over a
two-year period, the Court found that "not a single formal disciplinary action was
taken against any officer involved in the demonstrations considered in this
99
case."
More than thirty years ago, during the Mayweek 1971 demonstrations, the
Washington Post published a front page photograph of Deputy Chief Theodore
Zanders, then Commander of the Metropolitan Police Department's Civil Disturbance Unit, in direct violation of M.P.D. directives, spraying chemical Mace at a
distance of less than three feet on a group of demonstrators blocking an intersection. The District Judge in the Washington Mobilization case stated: "The Court
feels compelled to comment that if the Commander of the CDU . . . conducts
himself in a manner contrary to ... [Police Department] policies, then it is not
100
unlikely that this ... will also be manifested among his subordinates."
That is precisely what we are seeing today. M.P.D. management should not be
allowed to escape their delinquencies by attempting to shift the focus to their
police officers. It is not the officers who are to blame. It is the Chief who is
responsible for the misdirection and lack of accountability which encourage excessive actions. As envisaged in the American system, in which a tripartite government structure is designed to provide checks and balances, the M.P.D.'s
abdication of its responsibilities has resulted in the judicial and legislative interventions described in Part IV, infra.
IH.

THE UNDERMINING ROLE OF AN UNCRITICAL PRESS

"How did it come to this?" asked the Washington Post in its March 4, 2003
editorial condemning the police for the September 27, 2002 Pershing Park arrests. 10 1 The answer to that question goes back thirty years, which is when D.C.
Police management began using and the Post began praising the methods it now
condemns. Even when the Post finally recognized that there had been widespread
police lawlessness in Mayweek 1971, as described in Section L.A of this article,

99
100
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Washington Mobilization Committee, 400 F. Supp.186, 205 (D.D.C. 1975).
Id. at 204.
Editorial, Mishandled Mass Arrests, supra note 68.
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prepared to secthe Post rationalized, as the Mayor does now, that it was "not 102
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Still today, as the Post condemns the Pershing Park arrests as being "so over
the line that the city ultimately declined to prosecute any of those arrested, because it lacked probable cause, 1 ° 3 it perpetuates a myth of its own creation:
For many years D.C. police officers have enjoyed a well-deserved reputation for their deft handling of large public demonstrations. Thousands of
people have managed to mass in the city, petition their government or pro04
test public policy, and then depart town without leaving lawsuits behind.'
The fact is that the M.P.D. has rarely handled a major problematic demonstration well. That was so in 1971 and it is still the case today. The Post's reference to
"deft handling" of demonstrations is to the mostly non-problematic demonstrations that occupied the three decades between the end of the Vietnam War in the
mid-1970s and the beginning of the anti-globalization demonstrations in the late1990s. Most demonstrations in those years presented no great challenge to the
police. When D.C. police were again challenged by problematic demonstrations
in April 2000, as described in Section I.B of this report, they again engaged in the
same unlawful methods as in the 1960s and 1970s, and again left a trail of lawsuits
behind.
The Post at first turned a blind eye even to D.C. police officers' disregard of
the law in the Pershing Park arrests that the Post now condemns. Sometimes this
took the form of describing the "over the line" police tactics in jovial and approving tones, as in a story about the seventy-five bicycling demonstrators whom the
police channeled from Union Station into Pershing Park to be unlawfully
trapped, arrested, and detained. The story, entitled "Taken for a Ride," and subtitled "Police Turn the Bike Strike into a Tour de Force," says of the gathering
demonstrators, "They never saw it coming." It describes the police waiting to
escort the unsuspecting demonstrators into the Pershing Park trap as follows:
[Y]ou could tell that the D.C. police bikers thought this whole scene was
a hoot. They straddled their two-wheelers across the street, watching, smiling sometimes. They could afford to be patient. The route may have been
"secret," but the police had a pretty good idea of how this adventure was
going to end anyway. Everyone else was in for a surprise.10 5
These tactics-encircling, trapping, and arresting orderly demonstrators and
then preventively holding them for days under harsh conditions-dated back to
102 Editorial, EstablishingJustice and Insuring Tranquility, WASH. POST, May 23, 1971, at B-6.
The failures of the Washington Post's news coverage and editorials concerning the Mayweek 1971
mass arrests are discussed in detail in ACLU, supra note 26, at 54-57.
103 Editorial, It Takes A Judge, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2003, at A-20.
104 Editorial, Mishandled Mass Arrests, supra note 68.
105 David Montgomery, Taken for a Ride, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2002, at C-1, C-4.
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the 1970s, when they were declared unlawful. But at the time of the Pershing
Park arrests in September 2002-the arrests which, by March 2003, the Post
found to be "over the line"-the Post was amused at the clever trick the police
were playing on the demonstrators.
The question is why the Post waited over five months to condemn these tactics,
and did so only after an internal police report acknowledged that they were unlawful. And why, when the same unlawful measures were used against the April
2000 anti-globalization demonstrators, did the
Post praise them in an editorial
10 6
entitled "Hail To The Chief and His Cops."
The reporting and editorializing of the rest of the press and of the TV networks were just as far off the mark. The New York Times, for example, praised
the D.C. police in April 2000 for the "preemptive" and "wholesale arrests simply
to clear the streets," apparently oblivious to the fact that "preemptive" is synonymous with "prior restraints," which violate the First Amendment.'0 7 But it is appropriate to concentrate on the Washington Post because, along with the New
York Times, it has a tremendous effect, both locally and nationally, in setting the
tone of the news.1 0 8 Moreover, there is no city in America where a newspaper
has so fulfilled its role as the Fourth Estate, the ex-officio branch of our political
mechanisms which monitors, exposes, and forces reform when the government
fails. The Washington Post has probably been involved in every major reform that
has taken place in this city in the last fifty years. But, until the recent Pershing
Park revelations, the Post has rarely taken a position against unlawful police
methods during mass demonstrations. This is a major failure of the Washington
Post in serving the people of the District of Columbia.
The harm done by media praise for unlawful police actions is profound. In any
political system there are natural tensions. It is difficult for a police chief to inculcate in his or her police force the discipline necessary to operate professionally in
a mass demonstration when some demonstrators are engaging in disruptive or
confrontational actions. It is even harder for a mayor to put pressure on a police
chief who is unwilling to do so. When the newspaper that is the leading force in
shaping public and political opinion praises the police for keeping the traffic flowing, even if it means operating outside of the law, it places a nearly insurmountable burden on any more disciplined approach.
The media should do better. They should apply the same critical journalistic
and editorial vigor and scrupulousness to illegal police actions in demonstrations
as they apply to money and sex scandals.
Fortunately, the Washington Post appears to have had a change of heart. On
December 17, 2003, on the opening day of public hearings by the D.C. Council's
106
107
108

Editorial, Hail to the Chief and His Cops, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2000, at A-26.
Editorial, The Protestersand the Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2000, at A-24.
See ERIC ALTERMAN, WHAT LIBERAL MEDIA?, at 106 (2003).
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Committee on the Judiciary investigating police practices in recent demonstrations, the Post editorially encouraged the Committee's investigation of police
abuses in demonstrations:
The committee is expected to probe allegations of the use of subterfuge and
preemptive actions taken by the D.C. police to prevent people from assembling ... to plan protests at the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank meetings in April 2000 [and] . . . the mass arrests and detention of
people assembled in Pershing Park on September 27, 2002 [and] ... alleged
excess use of force by police in an April 2003 demonstration .... District
residents are likely to gain a sense of how far their department has fallen.10 9
The Post also called upon the Mayor to sign the Council's resulting enactment of
the First Amendment Rights and Police Standards Act of 2004, in its editorial of
January 26, 2005.110 It is to be hoped that the Post's new sensitivity to the constitutional rights of demonstrators is permanent.
As the late James Heller, then-Chairman of the local ACLU, wrote in a 1971
letter to the Washington Post, "When all three branches of government either
cooperate in or bless wholesale official illegality, the Fourth Estate should be
fulfilling its role as vigorous critic .. .
IV.

LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL REFORM: THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGITS
AND POLICE STANDARDS ACT OF

2004

AND THE ABBATE

CONSENT ORDER

In January 2005, the District of Columbia, rather than risking a trial of its
September 2002 abuses in Pershing Park, entered a Settlement Agreement
backed by a Consent Order in the ACLU lawsuit, Abbate v. Ramsey. 112 As Judge
Emmet Sullivan stated in approving and ordering the settlement, it is "truly historic." 113 In addition to a $425,000 damage award, estimated to yield about
$50,000 per plaintiff, exclusive of attorneys fees and costs,1 1 4 each plaintiff will
receive a letter of apology from the Chief of Police, stating, among other things,
that "Our investigation shows that you should not have been arrested or detained
...and that "we sincerely regret any hardships that our mistakes ... may have
caused you." '115 Most importantly, the Consent Order, in supervising enforcement of "Objectives" (a) through (k) following paragraph 13 of the Settlement
109 Editorial, Spotlight on the Cops, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2003, at A-42.
110 Editorial, The Price of Bad Policing, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2005, at A-20.
111 Letter reprinted in ACLU, supra note 26, at 57.
112 Supra notes 2 and 48.
113 Carol D. Leonnig & Del Quintin Wilber, D.C. Settles With Mass Arrest Victims, WASH.
POST, Jan. 25, 2005, at A-1, A-5.
114 Id.
115 Settlement Agreement, supra note 48, paragraph 10.
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Agreement, imposes a series of restrictions on police actions in dealing with dem116
onstrations, described infra.
Further, the M.P.D. must "perform and demonstrate its performance" in complying with these restrictions "through objectively verifiable means and methods"
which are spelled out in the Settlement Agreement (Paragraph 13). Specific procedures are established for the court to receive and adjudicate complaints of noncompliance. The Objectives must be written into the M.P.D.'s Mass Demonstration Handbook (Paragraph 12 of the Settlement Agreement), and changes cannot
be made without advance notification of, and if there is objection, negotiation
with the ACLU, the National Lawyers Guild, and the plaintiffs (Paragraph 15).
The order remains in effect for three years after which it is null and void (Consent Order, next to last paragraph).
The other and more profound action was the District of Columbia's enactment
of the First Amendment Rights and Police Standards Act of 2004. The Act resulted from public hearings, on December 17 and 18, 2003, by the Council's Committee on the Judiciary, under the leadership of Chairperson Kathy Patterson.
The Committee received the data in this article and testimony from numerous
critics of the M.P.D. Police officials defended their actions. While admitting that
some mistakes were made, Chief Ramsey said the police did nothing unlawful
17
and denied trying to limit free speech rights of demonstrators.'
Following those hearings, on July 13, 2004, Bill 15-968, the First Amendment
Rights and Police Standards Act of 2004, was introduced by eight of the thirteen
members of the Council, and, following further hearings, was approved by the
1 18
Council on December 21, 2004 by a twelve to one vote.
Under the District of Columbia's limited home rule, no D.C. enactment can
become law until it has survived a thirty-day congressional review period. After a
bill has been passed by the Council and signed, or not vetoed, by the Mayor, it
becomes an act. Then it goes to Congress for review. If Congress takes no action
within thirty days, the act becomes law. If Congress disapproves the act, it does
so by passing a joint resolution by both houses disapproving the act and then the
joint resolution goes to the President to be signed.1 1 9
On January 26, 2005, the veto deadline, Mayor Anthony Williams, announced
that he would neither veto nor sign Bill 15-968. This means that the Bill becomes
116 Id. paragraphs 11-13.
117 See, e.g., Arthur Santana, At Hearing D.C. Police Faulted on Mass Arrests, WASH. POST,
Dec. 18, 2003, at B-3; Arthur Santana, Ramsey Defends Surveilling Protestors, WASH. POST, Dec. 19,
2003, at B-5; Matthew Cella, Chief Denies Violating Protest-Speech Rights, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 19,
2003, at B-1.
118 The legislative history and the original and final text of Bill 15-968 are available at
www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us.
119 LEAH F. CHANIN, PAMELA J. GREGORY, SARA K. WIANT, LEGAL RESEARCH IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA, app. 1. at 1-61 (2d ed. 2000).
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an Act, and will become law if it survives the thirty-day congressional review
period. The Mayor said that Bill 15-968 goes too far and is superfluous in light of
the consent order issued two days earlier in the Abbate case, which the Mayor
said provides the only reforms that are necessary.12 0 The Mayor's failure to act
may have reflected the 12-1 vote by which the Council approved the Act, making
an override of a veto likely. He may have also been hoping that the Act would
not survive the thirty-day congressional review period.
A Congressional veto would be a drastic mistake for a number of practical reasons even beyond the protection of First Amendment rights in the nation's capital. First and foremost, police abuses are too expensive. Those which the new
Act is designed to remedy cost the District of Columbia over $5 million in the
1970s. 2 1 The suits now pending for the police actions of the last few years, which
have already cost the District $425,000 in the Abbate settlement covering only
seven named plaintiffs, promise to increase District liability far above the five
million dollar mark.1 22 Hopefully, Congress will be more restrained than to interfere with the District of Columbia's interest in democratic self-rule. If Congress does intervene, it should be prepared to assume the costs of liability in all
demonstration cases.
Whether or not Congress allows the Act to become law, 1 2 3 it will still serve as
model legislation for other cities. The record documented in this article and in
public hearings demonstrates that the Mayor is wrong in saying that the Act goes
too far or that the Abbate consent order is sufficient. The consent order remains
in effect for only three years, while the reforms in the Act would remain in effect
unless amended or repealed. In addition, the Abbate order deals with only seven
of the sixteen major reforms in the Act, and in some cases provides only suggestive rather than mandatory restraints on consistently abusive police actions. The
sixteen major reforms in the Act are as follows, with those addressed in the Abbate order marked with an asterisk. The entire text of the Act is reprinted as an
appendix to this article.
120 Associated Press, Williams Opposes Protester Bill, Jan. 26, 2005, available at http://
www.wjla.com/news/stories/0105/202883.html.
121 The class action in Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977), alone cost the District
of Columbia $3 million.
122 Plainly, straight extrapolation from the Abbate settlement does not necessarily apply, but if
the Abbate settlement of a net of $50,000.00 per plaintiff were a measure, the Barham class action for
400 individuals arrested in Pershing Park (supra note 73) could by itself cost the District in the range
of $20 million.
123 Even if the Act survives the thirty day review period, it is still vulnerable to congressional
override. Congress generally rejects DC legislation, not by exercising its thirty-day veto power, but by
attaching riders to appropriations bills for D.C. funding. For example, riders on appropriations bills
have kept a medical marijuana initiative approved by D.C voters from taking effect, and have prevented similar initiative efforts from appearing on the ballot. See, e.g., Arthur Santana, Court Blocks
D.C. Vote on Medical Use of Marijuana, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2002 at A-4.

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE DisTRiCT OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

1. The Act begins with a statement that it is the declared policy of the District
of Columbia that persons and groups have a First Amendment right to conduct
demonstrations "near the object of their protest." The Act requires the MPD "to
recognize and implement" this policy (sections 103, 104(a), 107(a)).
2. The Act substitutes for the existing permit system a notice system under
which demonstrators need not seek permission to demonstrate, but merely have
to provide advance notice. The M.P.D. may then impose reasonable time, place
and manner restrictions by issuing an "Approval of Plan" for the demonstration.
The demonstrators may negotiate with the M.P.D. or appeal to the Mayor regarding any provisions in the plan to which they object (sections 104(b), 105,
106).
3. No notice is required of a group that plans to remain on sidewalks and obey
traffic lights, or of a group of less than 50 persons (section 105(d)).
*4. The police may not disperse or arrest demonstrators solely for failing to
give advance notice, but shall accommodate such demonstrations if possible (section 107(f)(1)-(2)). Abbate does the same (Abbate Settlement Agreement, Objective (b)).
*5. The police may not disperse a demonstration unless a "significant number
or percentage of the assembly participants" violate "or are about to" violate the
law; otherwise only those in the group who are actually violating the law may be
dispersed or arrested. The clear and present danger standard is articulated as "an
imminent likelihood of violence endangering persons or threatening to cause significant property damage" (sections 104(b)(2)(C), 107). Abbate urges but does
not require such an approach (Objective (b)).
*6. Dispersals must be preceded by clear and audible notices with adequate
amplification, and an opportunity to leave (section 107(e)). Abbate Objective
(b).
7. Police may not encircle demonstrators unless there is "probable cause" for
and an intention to make specific arrests of a "significant number or percentage"
of the participants, or to provide for the safety of the demonstrators (section
108).
*8. Police officers must wear identifying badges and name plates, and, while
policing demonstrations, must wear "enhanced" identification "even if wearing
riot gear" (sections 109, 321). Abbate Objective (c).
*9. The police must contemporaneously record every arrest, and the Chief of
Police must account in writing for any failure to do so (section 110). Abbate
Objective (a).
*10. Restraints, including handcuffs, may be placed on those arrested only if
necessary, and not in any manner that causes pain (section 111). Abbate Objectives (i), (j), and (k).
*11. The M.P.D. must have adequate staff and processing systems to "ensure"
that persons arrested in a demonstration are promptly processed for release or
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presentation in court; all such persons must be given a written notice of their
rights; M.P.D. must provide food to any person not released within a reasonable
time of arrest (sections 112, 113). Abbate Objectives (e), (f),(g), and (h).
12. The media shall be allowed maximum access to police actions during demonstrations (section 114).
13. Riot-geared police may not be deployed unless there is "danger of violence" (section 116(a)).
14. Police may not use "large scale canisters of chemical irritant" against demonstrators unless such use is "necessary to protect officers or others from physical
harm or to arrest actively resisting subjects" and the official authorizing such use
must file a written report of justification; use of chemicals to disperse demonstrators is only permitted when "participants or others are committing acts of public
disobedience endangering public safety or security" (section 116(b)).
15. The M.P.D. may investigate demonstration planners and participants only
if there is "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity, defined as "a belief based
on articulable facts" and not "a mere hunch," nor based on "lawful political affiliation or activity." Restrictions are also placed on "preliminary inquiries" designed to determine whether there are grounds for an "investigation," and the
permissible techniques of investigations and inquiries are limited. Written authorizations and accountability are required throughout the system (sections 202(11),
205-212).
16. The requirements of the Act may be relied upon in lawsuits against the
police (sections 117, 213).
CONCLUSION

The misconception of mission and failure of leadership which for almost forty
years have characterized the M.P.D.'s mishandling of mass demonstrations are
not confined to the DC police but may also be found in other big cities' police
practices. These problems have intensified among police departments across the
nation as they have become increasingly militarized. 124 The trend of the nation's
police towards increasingly militarized aggression against demonstrators has been
spurred by three factors: (1) An overreaction to an unprepared Seattle police
force being overwhelmed by civilly disobedient anti-world trade protesters in No124 See, e.g., THE MIAMI MODEL (a film of the Miami police, resembling a military battalion
brutalizing peaceful demonstrators in November 2003 anti-world trade demonstrations), available at
http://www.fliff.com/2004/listings/miamimodel.htm. See also James Bovard, Time to Curb SWAT
Rampages, FUTURE OF FREEDOM FOUND. COMMENTARIES (Sept. 1999), available at http://www.fff.
org/comment/ed0999j.asp; Brian Rappert, A Framework for the Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons,
20 MED., CONFLICT & SURVIVAL 35, 54(2004) available at http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:UI
jYBF6N7UcJ:www.ex.ac.uk. Indeed, it appears that the use of armored riot squads against peaceful
demonstrators may even be spreading to small demonstrations in small towns. See Beth Quinn,
ACLU Decries Use of Force by Police at Bush Event, OREGONIAN, Jan. 7, 2005, at E-5.
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vember 1999; (2) A sense of greater license in the name of anti-terrorism as a
result of the September 11, 2001 attacks; and (3) An escalation in marketing by
125
the police armaments industry.
For these reasons, the First Amendment Rights and Police Standards Act of
2004 is a major and timely legislative achievement that should serve as a model
bill for other cities in reining in preemptive and violent police abuses of
demonstrators.
Unlike the Chinese police in Tiananmen Square or the police in Moscow or
Istanbul, the top priorities of the Metropolitan Police Department of the District
of Columbia and of police forces throughout the country should not be preventing temporary blockages of building entrances and traffic. The top priorities
should include upholding the rule of law and the Constitution to which they have
sworn allegiance. As the United States Supreme Court declared in 1937:
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more
imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free
speech, free press and free assembly .... Therein lies the security of the
1 26
republic, the very foundation of constitutional government.

125 See, e.g., Eric Lipton, Security Nominee got Rich on Tasers: Kerik's Relationship With StunGun Firm Earned Him Millions, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 10, 2004, at A-8.
126 DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
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APPENDIX

THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND POLICE STANDARDS
ACT OF

2004
ENROLLED ORIGINAL
Codificaton

AN ACT

District of
Columbia
Official Code
2001 Edition

IN THE COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

2005 Winter
Supp.
West Group
Publisher

To establish a policy for the District of Columbia regarding First Amendment assemblies; to
require the Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD") to recognize and implement
District policies regarding First Amendment assemblies, to require the Mayor to issue
regulations governing the issuance of approved plans for First Amendment assemblies, to
prohibit the use of a police line to encircle participants in a First Amendment assembly
unless MPD has probable cause to arrest, and has decided to arrest, the participants, to
require MPD to adopt a method of identifying officers during First Amendment
assemblies that provides for more visible identification, to require that MPD officers
document, either in writing or electronically, all arrests made during First Amendment
assemblies, to establish a policy regarding the use of restraints while processing persons
arrested during a First Amendment assembly, to require MPD to promptly process
persons arrested in connection with a First Amendment assembly, to require MPD to
provide persons arrested in connection with a First Amendment assembly with a written
notice identifying their release options, to require the Chief of Police to issue rules
regarding the issuance of police passes for members of the media, and to require
appropriate training for MPD personnel who handle First Amendment assemblies; to
amend the Office of Citizen Complaint Review Establishment Act of 1998 to give the
Police Complaints Board the authority to monitor and evaluate police handling of First
Amendment assemblies; to establish a policy of the District regarding MPD's
investigation and surveillance of political activity and organizations, to establish a District
policy that all MPD investigations and preliminary inquiries involving First Amendment
activities shall be conducted for a legitimate law enforcement objective, to require the
Chief of Police to issue regulations governing investigations and preliminary inquiries
involving First Amendment activities, to allow MPD to conduct limited preliminary
inquiries relating to upcoming First Amendment assemblies without additional
authorization, to establish rules for maintaining MPD Intelligence Section files and
records, to require that information entered into Intelligence Section files be evaluated
for source reliability, and content validity and accuracy, to require the Office of the
District of Columbia Auditor to audit annually MPD files and records relating to
investigations and preliminary inquiries involving First Amendment activities, and to
provide that standards for police conduct may be relied upon by persons exercising First
Amendment rights in any action alleging violations of statutory or common law rights; to
establish procedures regarding the post-and-forfeit procedure and its use in resolving
criminal charges, to require that MPD members, while in uniform, wear or display their
nameplate and badge, and not remove or cover this identifying information or prevent
persons from reading it, to provide that the provisions of this act establishing standards
for police conduct may be relied upon by persons exercising First Amendment rights in
any action alleging violations of statutory or common law rights; and to amend the Office
of Citizen Complaint Review Establishment Act of 1998 to establish Police Complaints
Board jurisdiction over complaints from members of the public alleging that MPD
Codification District of Colunbia Official Code, 2001 Edition
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officers failed to wear required identification or refused to identify themselves when
requested to do so by a member of the public.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, That this
act may be cited as the "First Amendment Rights and Police Standards Act of 2004".
TITLE I. FIRST AMENDMENT ASSEMBLIES.
Sec. 101. Short title.
This title may be cited as the "First Amendment Assemblies Act of 2004".
Subtitle A.
Sec. 102. Definitions.
For the purposes of this title, the term:
(1) "First Amendment assembly" means a demonstration, rally, parade, march,
picket line, or other similar gathering conducted for the purpose of persons expressing their
political, social, or religious views.
(2) "MPD" means the Metropolitan Police Department.
Sec. 103. Policy on First Amendment assemblies.
It is the declared public policy of the District of Columbia that persons and groups have a
right to organize and participate in peaceful First Amendment assemblies on the streets,
sidewalks, and other public ways, and in the parks of the District of Columbia, and to engage in
First Amendment assembly near the object of their protest so they may be seen and heard,
subject to reasonable restrictions designed to protect public safety, persons, and property, and to
accommodate the interest of persons not participating in the assemblies to use the streets,
sidewalks, and other public ways to travel to their intended destinations, and use the parks for
recreational purposes.
Sec. 104. Reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on First Amendment
assemblies.
(a) The MPD shall recognize and implement the District policy on First Amendment
assemblies established in section 103 when enforcing any restrictions on First Amendment
assemblies held on District streets, sidewalks, or other public ways, or in District parks.
(b) The MPD may enforce reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on First
Amendment assemblies by:
(1) Establishing reasonable restrictions on a proposed assembly prior to its
planned occurrence though the approval of a plan, where the organizers of the assembly give
notice;
(2) Enforcing reasonable restrictions during the occurrence of an assembly for
which a plan has been approved, which are in addition to the restrictions set forth in the
approved plan, where the additional restrictions are:
(A) Ancillary to the restrictions set forth in the approved plan and are
designed to implement the substance and intent in the approval of the plan;
(B) Enforced in response to the occurrence of actions or events unrelated
to the assembly that were not anticipated at the time of the approval of the plan and that were
not caused by the plan-holder, counter-demonstrators, or the police; or
Codification District ofColumbia Official Code, 2001 Edition
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(C) Enforced to address a determination by the MPD during the
pendency of the assembly that there exists an imminent likelihood of violence endangering
persons or threatening to cause significant property damage; or
(3) Enforcing reasonable restrictions on a First Amendment assembly during its
occurrence where a plan was not approved for the assembly.
(c) No time, place, or manner restriction regarding a First Amendment assembly shall be
based on the content of the beliefs expressed or anticipated to be expressed during the assembly,
or on factors such as the attire or appearance of persons participating or expected to participate
in an assembly, nor may such restrictions favor non-First Amendment activities over First
Amendment activities.
Sec. 105. Notice and plan approval process for First Amendment assemblies--generally.
(a) It shall not be an offense to assemble or parade on a District street, sidewalk, or other
public way, or in a District park, without having provided notice or obtained an approved
assembly plan.
(b) The purpose of the notice and plan approval process is to avoid situations where
more than one group seeks to use the same space at the same time and to provide the MPD and
other District agencies the ability to provide appropriate police protection, traffic control, and
other support for participants and other individuals.
(c) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, a person or group who wishes to
conduct a First Amendment assembly on a District street, sidewalk, or other public way, or in a
District park, shall give notice and apply for approval of an assembly plan before conducting the
assembly.
(d) A person or group who wishes to conduct a First Amendment assembly on a District
street, sidewalk, or other public way, or in a District park, is not required to give notice or apply
for approval of an assembly plan before conducting the assembly where:
(1) The assembly will take place on public sidewalks and crosswalks and will not
prevent other pedestrians from using the sidewalks and crosswalks;
(2) The person or group reasonably anticipates that fewer than 50 persons will
participate in the assembly, and the assembly will not occur on a District street; or
(3) The assembly is for the purpose of an immediate and spontaneous expression
of views in response to a public event.
(e) The Mayor shall not enforce any user fees on persons or groups that organize or
conduct First Amendment assemblies.
(f) The Mayor shall not require, separate from or in addition to the requirements for
giving notice of or applying for approval of an assembly plan for a First Amendment assembly,
that persons give notice to, or obtain a permit or plan from, the Chief of Police, or other District
officials or agencies, as a prerequisite for making or delivering an address, speech, or sermon
regarding any political, social, or religious subject in any District street, sidewalk, other public
way, or park.
(g) The Mayor shall not require, separate from or in addition to the requirements for
giving notice of or applying for approval of an assembly plan for a First Amendment assembly,
that persons give notice to, or obtain a permit or plan from the Chief of Police, the Department
of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, or any other District official or agency as a prerequisite for
using a stand or structure in connection with such an assembly; provided, that a First
Amendment assembly plan may contain limits on the nature, size, or number of stands or
structures to be used as required to maintain public safety. Individuals conducting a First
Amendment assembly under subsection (d) of this section may use a stand or structure so long as
it does not prevent others from using the sidewalk.
Codification District of Columbia Official Code,2001 Edition
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(h) The Mayor shall not require, separate from or in addition to the requirements for
giving notice of or applying for approval of an assembly plan for a First Amendment assembly,
that persons give notice to, or obtain a permit or plan from, the Chief of Police, the Director of
the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, or any other District official or agency as a
prerequisite for selling demonstration-related merchandise within an area covered by an
approved plan or within an assembly covered by subsection (d) of this section; provided, that
nothing in this subsection shall be construed to authorize any person to sell merchandise in a
plan-approved area contrary to the wishes of the plan-holder.
Sec. 106. Notice and plan approval process for First Amendment
assemblies-processing applications; appeals; rules.
(a)(1) Subject to the appeal process set forth in subsection (d) of this section, the
authority to receive and review a notice of and an application for approval of a plan for a First
Amendment assembly on District streets, sidewalks, and other public ways, and in District parks,
and to grant, deny, or revoke an assembly plan, is vested exclusively with the Chief of Police or
his or her designee.
(2) Persons or groups providing notice to and applying for approval of a plan
from the District government to conduct a First Amendment assembly on a District street,
sidewalk, or other public way, or in a District park, shall not be required to obtain approval for
the assembly from any other official, agency, or entity in the District government, including the
District of Columbia Emergency Management Agency, the Mayor's Special Events Task Group,
or the Department of Parks and Recreation.
(b)(1) The Chief of Police shall take final action on a notice of and an application for
approval of a plan for a First Amendment assembly within a reasonably prompt period of time
following receipt of the completed application, considering such factors as the anticipated size of
the assembly, the proposed date and location, and the number of days between the application
date and the proposed assembly date, and shall establish specific timetables for processing an
application by rules issued pursuant to subsection (e) of this section.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, where a complete
application for approval of a First Amendment assembly plan is filed 60 days or more prior to the
proposed assembly date, the application shall receive final action no later than 30 days prior to
the proposed assembly.
(3) Following the approval of an assembly plan in response to an application
pursuant to paragraph (2) of this subsection, the Chief of Police may, after consultations with the
person or group giving notice of the assembly, amend the plan to make reasonable modifications
to the assembly location or route up until 10 days prior to the assembly date based on
considerations of public safety.
(c) The Chief of Police shall inform the person or group giving notice of an assembly, in
writing, of the reasons for any decision to:
(1) Deny an application for approval of a First Amendment assembly plan;
(2) Revoke an assembly plan prior to the date of the planned assembly; or
(3) Approve an assembly plan subject to time, place, or manner restrictions that
the applicant has advised the Chief of Police are objectionable to the applicant.
(d)(1) Any applicant whose proposed assembly plan has been denied, revoked prior to
the date of the planned assembly, or granted subject to time, place, or manner restrictions
deemed objectionable by the applicant, may appeal such decision to the Mayor or the Mayor's
designee, who shall concur with, modify, or overrule the decision of the Chief of Police.
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(2) The Mayor shall make a decision on appeal expeditiously and prior to the date
and time the assembly is planned to commence, and shall explain in writing the reasons for the
decision.
(e)(1) Within 90 days of the effective date of this act, the Mayor, pursuant to Title 1 of
the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act, approved October 21, 1968 (82 Stat.
1204; D.C. Official Code 2-501 et. seq.),and in accordance with this title, shall issue rules
governing the approval of plans to persons or groups seeking to conduct a First Amendment
assembly on District streets, sidewalks, or other public ways, or in District parks.
(2) Existing procedures for the issuance of permits to persons or groups seeking
to conduct a First Amendment assembly on District streets, sidewalks, or other public ways, or
in District parks, that are not inconsistent with this title shall remain in effect pending the
issuance of the rules promulgated under paragraph (1) of this subsection..
Sec. 107. Police handling and response to First Amendment assemblies.
(a) The MPD's handling of, and response to, all First Amendment assemblies shall be
designed and implemented to carry out the District policy on First Amendment assemblies
established in section 103.
(b)(1) Where participants in a First Amendment assembly fail to comply with reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions, the MPD shall, to the extent reasonably possible, first seek
to enforce the restrictions through voluntary compliance and then seek, as appropriate, to
enforce the restrictions by issuing citations to, or by arresting, the specific non-compliant
persons, where probable cause to issue a citation or to arrest is present.
(2) Nothing in this subsection is intended to restrict the authority of the MPD to
arrest persons who engage in unlawful disorderly conduct, or violence directed at persons or
property.
(9) Where participants in a First Amendment assembly, or other persons at the location of
the assembly, engage in unlawful disorderly conduct, violence toward persons or property, or
unlawfully threaten violence, the MPD shall, to the extent reasonably possible, respond by
dispersing, controlling, or arresting the persons engaging in such conduct, and not by issuing a
general order to disperse, thus allowing the First Amendment assembly to continue.
(d) The MPD shall not issue a general order to disperse to participants in a First
Amendment assembly except where:
(1) A significant number or percentage of the assembly participants fail to adhere
to the imposed time, place, and manner restrictions, and either the compliance measures set forth
in subsection (b) of this section have failed to result in substantial compliance or there is no
reasonable likelihood that the measures set forth in subsection (b) of this section will result in
substantial compliance;
(2) A significant number or percentage of the assembly participants are engaging
in, or are about to engage in, unlawful disorderly conduct or violence toward persons or
property; or
(3) A public safety emergency has been declared by the Mayor that is not based
solely on the fact that the First Amendment assembly is occurring, and the Chief of Police
determines that the public safety concerns that prompted the declaration require that the First
Amendment assembly be dispersed.
(e)(1) If and when the MPD determines that a First Amendment assembly, or part
thereof, should be dispersed, the MPD shall issue at least one clearly audible and understandable
order to disperse using an amplification system or device, and shall provide the participants a
reasonable and adequate time to disperse and a clear and safe route for dispersal.
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(2) Except where there is imminent danger of personal injury or significant
damage to property, the MPD shall issue multiple dispersal orders and, if appropriate, shall issue
the orders from multiple locations. The orders shall inform persons of the route or routes by
which they may disperse and shall state that refusal to disperse will subject them to arrest.
(3) Whenever possible, MPD shall make an audio or video recording of orders to
disperse.
(f)(l) Where a First Amendment assembly is held on a District street, sidewalk, or other
public way, or in a District park, and an assembly plan has not been approved, the MPD shall,
consistent with the interests of public safety, seek to respond to and handle the assembly in
substantially the same manner as it responds to and handles assemblies with approved plans.
(2) An order to disperse or arrest assembly participants shall not be based solely
on the fact that a plan has not been approved for the assembly.
(3) When responding to and handling a First Amendment assembly for which a
plan has not been approved, the MPD may take into account any actual diminution, caused by
the lack of advance notice, in its ability, or the ability of other governmental agencies,
appropriately to organize and allocate their personnel and resources so as to protect the rights of
both persons exercising free speech and other persons wishing to use the streets, sidewalks,
other public ways, and parks.

Sec. 108. Use of police lines.
No emergency area or zone will be established by using a police line to encircle, or
substantially encircle, a demonstration, rally, parade, march, picket line, or other similar assembly
(or subpart thereof) conducted for the purpose of persons expressing their political, social, or
religious views except where there is probable cause to believe that a significant number or
percentage of the persons located in the area or zone have committed unlawful acts (other than
failure to have an approved assembly plan) and the police have the ability to identify those
individuals and have decided to arrest them; provided, that this section does not prohibit the use
of a police line to encircle an assembly for the safety of the demonstrators.
Sec. 109. Identification of MPD personnel policing First Amendment assemblies.
The MPD shall implement a method for enhancing the visibility to the public of the name
or badge number of officers policing a First Amendment assembly by modifying the manner in
which those officers' names or badge numbers are affixed to the officers' uniforms or helmets.
The MPD shall ensure that all uniformed officers assigned to police First Amendment assemblies
are equipped with the enhanced identification and may be identified even if wearing riot gear.
Sec. 110. Documentation of arrests in connection with a First Amendment assembly.
(a) The MPD shall cause every arrest in connection with a First Amendment assembly to
be documented, in writing or electronically, by the officer at the scene who makes the arrest.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the arrest documentation shall be
completed at a time reasonably contemporaneous with the arrest, and shall include:
(1) The name of the person arrested;
(2) The date and time of the arrest;
(3) Each offense charged;
(4) The location of the arrest, and of each offense;
(5) A brief statement of the facts and evidence establishing the basis to arrest the
person for each offense;
(6) An identification of the arresting officer (name and badge number); and
(7) Any other information the MPD may determine is necessary.
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(c)(1) The Chief of Police may implement a procedure for documenting arrests in
connection with a First Amendment assembly different from that set forth in subsection (b) of
this section where the Chief determines that an emergency exists with regard to a specific First
Amendment assembly, and that implementation of the alternative procedure is necessary to assist
police in protecting persons, property, or preventing unlawful conduct; provided, that any such
procedure shall adequately document the basis that existed for each individual arrest.
(2) The determination of the Chief of Police made pursuant to paragraph (1) of
this subsection shall be made in writing and shall include an explanation of the circumstances
justifying the determination.
(3) The determination of the Chief of Police made pursuant to paragraph (1) of
this subsection shall be valid for a period of 24 hours, and may be renewed by the Chief, or in the
Chief's absence, the Chief's designee.
Sec. 111. Use of handcuffs, plastic cuffs, or other physical restraints on persons arrested
in connection with a First Amendment assembly.
(a) The MPD shall adhere to the standard set forth in subsection (b) of this section in
using handcuffs, plastic cuffs, or other physical restraints on any person arrested in connection
with a First Amendment assembly who is being held in custody in the following circumstances:
(1) The arrestee is being held in a police processing center:
(A) To determine whether the arrestee should be released or the method
for release;
(B) To determine whether the arrestee should be presented to court; or
(C) Pending presentation to court;
(2) The arrestee is being held in an unsecured processing center, and is not being
held in a cell; or
(3) The arrestee is charged solely with one or more misdemeanor offenses, none
of which have, as one of their elements, the commission of a violent act toward another person
or a threat to commit such an act, or the destruction of property, or a threat to destroy property.
(b) With regard to any person who is being held in custody by the MPD in the
circumstances identified in subsection (a) of this section, the MPD shall use handcuffs, plastic
cuffs, or other physical restraints only to the extent reasonably necessary, and in a manner
reasonably necessary, for the safety of officers and arrestees; provided, that no such person shall
be restrained by connecting his or her wrist to his or her ankle, and no such person shall be
restrained in any other manner that forces the person to remain in a physically painful position.
(c) Nothing in this section is intended to restrict the otherwise lawful authority of the
MPD to use handcuffs, plastic cuffs, or other physical restraints on persons arrested in
connection with a First Amendment assembly at the time of or immediately following arrest,
while arrestees are being transported to a processing center, or while arrestees are being
transported to or from court.
Sec. 112. Prompt release of persons arrested in connection with a First Amendment
assembly.
(a)(1) The MPD shall promptly process any person arrested in connection with a First
Amendment assembly to determine whether the person is eligible for immediate release pursuant
to a lawful release option, and shall promptly release any person so eligible who opts for release.
(2) The MPD shall promptly release any person arrested in connection with a
First Amendment assembly who, it is subsequently determined, should not be charged with any
offense, or as to whom arrest documentation has not been prepared and preserved.
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(b)(1) The MPD shall require that an officer holding a supervisory rank document and
explain any instance in which a person arrested in connection with a First Amendment assembly
who opts for release pursuant to any lawful release option or who is not charged with any
offense is not released within 4 hours from the time of arrest.
(2) The MPD shall provide to any person not released within a reasonable time of
arrest food appropriate to the person's health.
(c) The Chief of Police shall issue an annual public report that:
(1) Identifies the number of persons in the preceding year who were arrested in
connection with a First Amendment assembly and opted for release pursuant to any lawful
release option or were not charged with any offense and were not released from custody within 4
hours after the time of arrest;
(2) Discusses the reasons for the delay in processing such persons for release; and
(3) Describes any steps taken or to be taken to ensure that all such persons are
released within 4 hours from the time of arrest.
(d) The MPD shall ensure that it possesses an automated information processing system
that enables it to promptly process for release or presentation to the court all persons arrested in
connection with a First Amendment assembly, and shall ensure that such system is fully
operational (with respect to its hardware, software, and staffing) prior to a First Amendment
assembly that has a potential for a substantial number of arrests.
Sec. 113. Notice to persons arrested in connection with a First Amendment assembly of
their release options.
(a) The MPD shall filly and accurately advise persons arrested in connection with a First
Amendment assembly of all potential release options when processing them for release from
custody or for presentation to court.
(b)(1) The MPD shall provide a written notice identifying all release options to each
person arrested in connection with a First Amendment assembly who is charged solely with one
or more misdemeanor offenses. The notice shall clearly indicate that the options are alternative
methods for obtaining a prompt release, and that the availability of each option is dependent on a
determination that the arrestee is eligible to participate in that release option. The notice shall
also identify the misdemeanor charges lodged against the arrestee.
(2) The notice required by paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be offered in the
Spanish language to those persons who require or desire notice in this manner, and shall be
offered in other languages as is reasonable to ensure meaningful access to the notice for persons
who are limited English proficient.
Sec. 114. Police-media relations.
(a) Within 90 days of the effective date of this act, the Chief of Police, pursuant to Title 1
of the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act, approved October 21, 1968 (82 Stat.
1204; D.C. Official Code 2-501 et seq.), shall issue rules governing police passes for media
personnel.
(b) Within 90 days of the effective date of this act, the Chief of Police shall develop and
implement a written policy governing interactions between the MPD and media representatives
who are in or near an area where a First Amendment assembly is ongoing and who are reporting
on the First Amendment assembly. The policy shall be consistent with the requirements of
subsection (c) of this section.
(c)(1) The MPD shall allow media representatives reasonable access to all areas where a
First Amendment assembly is occurring. At a minimum, the MPD shall allow media
representatives no less access than that enjoyed by members of the general public and, consistent
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with public safety considerations, shall allow media representatives access to promote public
knowledge of the assembly.
(2) The MPD personnel located in or near an area where a First Amendment
assembly is ongoing shall recognize and honor media credentials issued by or officially
recognized by the MPD.
(3) The MPD shall make reasonable accommodations to allow media
representatives effectively to use photographic, video, or other equipment relating to their
reporting of a First Amendment assembly.
Sec. 115. Training for handling of, and response to, First Amendment assemblies.
The Chief of Police shall ensure that all relevant MPD personnel, including command
staff, supervisory personnel, and line officers, are provided regular and periodic training on the
handling of, and response to, First Amendment assemblies. The training shall be tailored to the
duties and responsibilities assigned to different MPD positions and ranks during a First
Amendment assembly. The training shall include instruction on the provisions of this title, and
the regulations issued hereunder.
Sec. 116. Use of riot gear and riot tactics at First Amendment assemblies.
(a) Officers in riot gear shall be deployed consistent with the District policy on First
Amendment assemblies and only where there is a danger of violence. Following any deployment
of officers in riot gear, the commander at the scene shall make a written report to the Chief of
Police within 48 hours and that report shall be available to the public on request.
(b)(1) Large scale canisters of chemical irritant shall not be used at First Amendment
assemblies absent the approval of a commanding officer at the scene, and the chemical irritant is
reasonable and necessary to protect officers or others from physical harm or to arrest actively
resisting subjects.
(2) Chemical irritant shall not be used by officers to disperse a First Amendment
assembly unless the assembly participants or others are committing acts of public disobedience
endangering public safety and security.
(3) A commanding officer who makes the determination specified in paragraph
(1) of this subsection shall file with the Chief of Police a written report explaining his or her
action within 48 hours after the event.
Sec. 117. Construction.
The provisions of this title are intended to protect persons who are exercising First
Amendment rights in the District of Columbia, and the standards for police conduct set forth in
this title may be relied upon by such persons in any action alleging violations of statutory or
common law rights.
Subtitle B.
Sec. 141. Section 5 of the Office of Citizen Complaint Review Establishment Act of
1998, effective March 26, 1999 (D.C. Law 12-208; D.C. Official Code § 5-1104), is amended by
adding a new subsection (d-1) to read as follows:
"(d-1) The Board may, where appropriate, monitor and evaluate MPD's handling of, and
Amend
response to, First Amendment assemblies, as defined in section 102 of the First Amendment
Rights and Police Standards Act of 2004, passed on 2ndreading on December 21, 2004 (Enrolled § 5-1104
version of Bill 15-968), held on District streets, sidewalks, or other public ways, or in District
parks.".
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Sec. 142. Section 705.1 of the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations is amended
by striking the phrase "regulation." and inserting the phrase "regulation; provided, that the term
"parade" shall not include a First Amendment assembly, as that term is defined in section 102(1)
of the First Amendment Rights and Police Standards of 2004, passed on 2 d reading on
December 21, 2004 (Enrolled version of Bill 15-968)." in its place.
Sec. 143. Chapter 21 of Title 24 of the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations is
amended as follows:
(a) Section 2102.3 is amended to read as follows:
"2102.3 Passes shall be in the form and number approved by the Chief of Police.".
(b) Section 2102.4 is repealed.

DCMR

TITLE II. POLICE INVESTIGATIONS CONCERNING FIRST AMENDMENT
ACTIVITIES.

DCMR

Sec. 201. Short title.
This title may be cited as the "Police Investigations Concerning First Amendment
Activities Act of 2004".
Sec. 202. Definitions.
For the purposes of this title, the term:
(1) "First Amendment activities" means constitutionally protected speech or
association, or conduct related to freedom of speech, free exercise of religion, freedom of the
press, the right to assemble, and the right to petition the government.
(2) "First Amendment assembly" means a demonstration, rally, parade, march,
picket line, or other similar gathering conducted for the purpose of persons expressing their
political, social, or religious views;
(3) "Informant" means a person who provides information to the police
department motivated by the expectation of receiving compensation or benefit, or otherwise is
acting under the direction of the MPD.
(4) "Intelligence Section" means the Intelligence Section of the Special
Investigations Division of MPD, or its successor section or unit.
(5) "Intelligence Section file" means the investigative intelligence information
gathered, received, developed, analyzed, and maintained by the Intelligence Section of the
Metropolitan Police Department, pursuant to an investigation or preliminary inquiry involving
First Amendment activity.
(6) "Legitimate law enforcement objective" means the detection, investigation,
deterrence, or prevention of crime, or the apprehension and prosecution of a suspected criminal;
provided, that a person shall not be considered to be pursuing a legitimate law enforcement
objective if the person is acting based upon the race, ethnicity, religion, national origin, lawful
political affiliation or activity, or lawful news-gathering activity of an individual or group.
(7) "Mail cover" means the inspection and review of the outside of envelopes of
posted mail and other delivered items.
(8) "Mail opening" means the opening and inspection and review of the contents
of posted mail and other delivered items.
(9) "Minimization procedures" means reasonable precautions taken to minimize
the interference with First Amendment activities, without impairing the success of the
investigation or preliminary inquiry.
(10) "MPD" means the Metropolitan Police Department.
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(11) "Reasonable suspicion" means a belief based on articulable facts and
circumstances indicating a past, current, or impending violation of law. The reasonable suspicion
standard is lower than the standard of probable cause; however, a mere hunch is insufficient as a
basis for reasonable suspicion. A suspicion that is based upon the race, ethnicity, religion,
national origin, lawful political affiliation or activity, or lawful news-gathering activity of an
individual or group is not a reasonable suspicion.
Sec. 203. Purpose; scope.
This title establishes the responsibilities of and procedures for the MPD relating to
investigations and preliminary inquiries, including criminal intelligence investigations and
inquiries, that may affect activities protected by the First Amendment. This title does not apply
to criminal investigations or inquiries that do not involve First Amendment activities.
Sec. 204. Policy on investigations and inquiries involving First Amendment activities.
The MPD shall conduct all investigations and preliminary inquiries involving First
Amendment activities for a legitimate law enforcement objective and, in so doing, shall safeguard
the constitutional rights and liberties of all persons. MPD members may not investigate,
prosecute, disrupt, interfere with, harass, or discriminate against any person engaged in First
Amendment activity for the purpose of punishing, retaliating, preventing, or hindering the person
from exercising his or her First Amendment rights.
Sec. 205. Authorization for investigations involving First Amendment activities.
(a) The MPD may conduct a criminal investigation that involves the First Amendment
activities of persons, groups, or organizations only when there is reasonable suspicion to believe
that the persons, groups, or organizations are planning or engaged in criminal activity, and the
First Amendment activities are relevant to the criminal investigation.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, a MPD member may undertake
an investigation under this section only after receiving prior written authorization from the
Commander, Office of the Superintendent of Detectives, or such other MPD commander of
similar rank designated by MPD regulations. No MPD member may conduct an investigation
involving First Amendment activities without the authorization required by this section.
(c) To obtain authorization for an investigation under this section, a MPD member shall
submit a memorandum to the Commander, Office of Superintendent of Detectives, or such other
MPD commander of similar rank as designated by MPD regulations:
(1) Identifying the subject of the proposed investigation, if known;
(2) Stating the facts and circumstances that create a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity; and
(3) Describing the relevance of the First Amendment activities to the
investigation.
(d)(1) Written authorization of an investigation under this section may be granted for a
period of up to 120 days where the designated commander determines that there is reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.
(2) If the MPD seeks to continue an investigation past 120 days, a new
memorandum and approval shall be obtained for each subsequent 120-day period. The new
memorandum shall describe the information already collected and demonstrate that an extension
is reasonably necessary to pursue the investigation.
(3) The Chief of Police shall approve investigations open for more than one year,
and shall do so in writing, stating the justification for the investigation.
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(e) If there is an immediate threat of criminal activity, an investigation under this section
may begin before a memorandum is prepared and approved; provided, that written approval
must be obtained within 24 hours from the Chief of Police or his designee.
(f) An investigation involving First Amendment activities shall be terminated when logical
leads have been exhausted and no legitimate law enforcement purpose justifies its continuance.
Sec. 206. Authorization for preliminary inquiries involving First Amendment activities.
(a) The MPD may initiate a preliminary inquiry involving First Amendment activities, to
obtain sufficient information to determine whether or not an investigation is warranted, where:
(1) The MPD receives information or an allegation the responsible handling of
which requires further scrutiny; and
(2) The information or allegation received by MPD does not justify opening a full
investigation because it does not establish reasonable suspicion that persons are planning or
engaged in criminal activity.
(b)(1) A MPD member may undertake a preliminary inquiry involving First Amendment
activities, to obtain sufficient information to determine whether or not an investigation is
warranted, only by receiving prior written authorization from the Commander, Office of
Superintendent of Detectives, or such other MPD commander of similar rank designated by
MPD regulations.
(2) Except as provided in section 209, no MPD member may conduct a
preliminary inquiry involving First Amendment activities without the authorization required by
this section.
(c) To obtain authorization for a preliminary inquiry, a MPD member shall submit a
memorandum to the Commander, Office of Superintendent of Detectives, or such other MPD
commander of similar rank designated by MPD regulations:
(1) Identifying the subject of the proposed inquiry, if known;
(2) Stating the information or allegations that are the basis for the preliminary
inquiry; and
(3) Describing the relevance of the First Amendment activities to the inquiry.
(d)( 1) A preliminary inquiry under this section may be authorized for a period of up to 60
days.
(2) If the MPD seeks to continue this preliminary inquiry beyond 60 days, a new
memorandum and approval must be obtained for an additional 60-day period. The new
memorandum must describe the information already collected and demonstrate that an extension
is reasonably necessary to pursue the inquiry.
(3) The Chief of Police shall approve a preliminary inquiry under this section that
is to remain open for more than 120 days, and shall do so in writing, stating the justification for
the preliminary inquiry.
(e) A preliminary inquiry under this section shall be terminated when it becomes apparent
that a full investigation is not warranted.
Sec. 207. Techniques and procedures for investigations and preliminary inquiries.
(a) The investigative techniques used in any particular investigation or preliminary inquiry
shall be dictated by the needs of the investigation or inquiry.
(b) The MPD shall employ minimization procedures in all investigations and preliminary
inquiries involving First Amendment activities. Where the conduct of an investigation or
preliminary inquiry presents a choice between the uses of more or less intrusive methods or
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investigative techniques, the MPD shall consider whether the information could be obtained in a
timely and effective way by the less intrusive means.
(c) The following techniques may be used in an authorized investigation or authorized
preliminary inquiry involving First Amendment activities, without additional authorization:
(1) Examination of public records and other sources of information available to
the public;
(2) Examination of MPD indices, files, and records;
(3) Examination of records and files of other government or law enforcement
agencies;
(4) Interviews of any person; and
(5) Physical, photographic, or video surveillance from places open to the public
or otherwise legally made available.
(d) Undercover officers, informants, and mail covers may be used in an authorized
preliminary inquiry after written approval and authorization is obtained from the Chief of Police
or his designee. Mail openings and Wire Interception and Interception of Oral Communications,
as defined in D.C. Official Code § 23-54 1, shall not be used in a preliminary inquiry.
(e) The following techniques may be used in an authorized investigation involving First
Amendment activities, after written approval and authorization is obtained from the Chief of
Police or his designee:
(1) Wire Interception and Interception of Oral Communications, as defined in
D.C. Official Code § 23-541;
(2) Undercover officers and informants; and
(3) Mail covers, mail openings, pen registers, and trap and trace devices.
(f) If there is an immediate threat of criminal activity, verbal authority by the designated
MPD commander to use the investigative techniques described in subsection (d) and (e) of this
section is sufficient until a written authorization can be obtained; provided, that other legal
requirements have been met. The required written authorization shall be obtained within 5 days
of the occurrence of the emergency.
Sec. 208. Rules for investigations and preliminary inquiries.
(a) Within 90 days of the effective date of this title, the Chief of Police, pursuant to Title
I of the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act, approved October 21, 1968 (82
Stat. 1204; D.C. Official Code § 2-501 et seq.), and in accordance with this title, shall issue rules
governing investigations and preliminary inquiries involving First Amendment activities,
including the authorization, conduct, monitoring, and termination of investigations and
preliminary inquiries, and the maintenance, dissemination, and purging of records, files, and
information from such investigations and preliminary inquiries.
(b) The rules issued under subsection (a) of this section shall require the MPD to direct
undercover officers and informants to refrain from:
(1) Participating in unlawful acts or threats of violence;
(2) Using unlawful techniques to obtain information;
(3) Initiating, proposing, approving, directing, or suggesting unlawful acts or a
plan to commit unlawful acts;
(4) Being present during criminal activity or remaining present during
unanticipated criminal activity, unless it has been determined to be necessary for the
investigation;
(5) Engaging in any conduct the purpose of which is to disrupt, prevent, or hinder
the lawful exercise of First Amendment activities;
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(6) Attending meetings or engaging in other activities for the purpose of obtaining
legally privileged information, such as attorney-client communications or physician-patient
communications; and
(7) Recording or maintaining a record concerning persons or organizations who
are not a target of the investigation or preliminary inquiry, unless the information is material to
the investigation or preliminary inquiry, or the information would itselfjustify an investigation or
preliminary inquiry under this title.
(c) The rules issued under subsection (a) of this section shall require that all members
assigned to the Intelligence Section, Special Investigations Branch, attend training on this title
and the rules. The rules shall require that all members of the Intelligence Section sign an
acknowledgment that they have received, read, understood, will abide by, and will maintain a
copy of this title and the rules.
Sec. 209. Preliminary inquiries relating to First Amendment assemblies.
(a) A MPD member may initiate a preliminary inquiry relating to a First Amendment
assembly, for public safety reasons, without authorization, as follows:
(1) Members may gather public information regarding future First Amendment
assemblies and review notices and approved assembly plans.
(2) Members may communicate overtly with the organizers of a First Amendment
assembly concerning the number of persons expected to participate, the activities anticipated,
and other similar information regarding the time, place, and manner of the assembly.
(3) Members may communicate overtly with persons other than the organizers of
a First Amendment assembly to obtain information relating to the number of persons expected to
participate in the assembly.
(4) Members may collect information on prior First Amendment assemblies to
determine what police resources may be necessary to adequately protect participants, bystanders,
and the general public, and to enforce all applicable laws.
(b) Filming and photographing First Amendment assemblies may be conducted by MPD
members for the purpose of documenting violations of law and police actions, as an aid to future
coordination and deployment of police units, and for training purposes. Filming and
photographing of First Amendment assemblies may not be conducted for the purpose of
identifying and recording the presence of individual participants who are not engaged in unlawful
conduct.
Sec. 210. Authorized public activities.
Nothing in this title shall be interpreted as prohibiting any MPD member from, in the
course of their duties, visiting any place, and attending any event that is open to the public, or
reviewing information that is in the public domain, on the same terms and conditions as members
of the public, so long as members have a legitimate law enforcement objective; provided, that
any undercover activities shall be authorized as required by section 207.
Sec. 211. Files and records.
(a) Information to be retained in an Intelligence Section file shall be evaluated for the
reliability of the source of the information and the validity and accuracy of the content of the
information prior to filing. The file shall state whether the reliability, validity, and accuracy of
the information have been corroborated.
(b) The MPD shall not collect or maintain information about the political, religious,
social, or personal views, associations, or activities of any individual, group, or organization
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unless such information is material to an authorized investigation or preliminary inquiry involving
First Amendment activities.
(c) No information shall be knowingly included in an Intelligence Section file that has
been obtained in violation of any applicable federal, state, or local law, ordinance, or regulation.
The Chief of Police, or his designee, shall be responsible for establishing that no information is
entered in Intelligence Section files in violation of this subsection.
(d) The MPD may disseminate information obtained during preliminary inquiries and
investigations involving First Amendment activities to federal, state, or local law enforcement
agencies, or local criminal justice agencies, only when such information:
(1) Falls within the investigative or protective jurisdiction or litigation-related
responsibility of the agency;
(2) May assist in preventing an unlawful act or the use of violence, or any other
conduct dangerous to human life; or
(3) Is required to be disseminated by an interagency agreement, statute, or other
law.
(e) All requests for dissemination of information from an Intelligence Section file shall be
evaluated and approved by the Chief of Police or his designee. All dissemination of information
shall be done by written transmittal or recorded on a form that describes the documents or
information transmitted, and a record of the dissemination shall be maintained for a minimum of
one year.
(f) Intelligence Section file information shall not be disseminated to any non-law
enforcement agency, department, group, organization, or individual, except as authorized by law.
(g) The Chief of Police or his designee shall periodically review information contained in
Intelligence Section files and purge records that are not accurate, reliable, relevant, and timely.
Sec. 212. Monitoring and auditing of investigations and preliminary inquiries.
(a) Authorizations of investigations and preliminary inquiries involving First Amendment
activities are to be reviewed every 90 days by a panel of no fewer than 3 MPD commanding
officers designated by the Chief of Police.
(b) The Commander, Office of the Superintendent of Detectives, or a commander of
similar rank designated in the MPD regulations, shall monitor the compliance of undercover
officers and informants with the requirements of this title.
(c) The Chief of Police shall annually prepare a report on the MPD's investigations and
preliminary inquiries involving First Amendment activities. The report shall be transmitted to the
Mayor and Council and a notice of its publication shall be published in the District of Columbia
Register. The report shall include, at a minimum,
(1) The number of investigations authorized;
(2) The number of authorizations for investigation sought but denied;
(3) The number of requests from outside agencies, as documented by forms
requesting access to records of investigations conducted pursuant to this title;
(4) The number of arrests, prosecutions, or other law enforcement actions taken
as a result of such investigations; and
(5) A description of any violations of this title or the regulations issued pursuant
to this title, and the actions taken as a result of the violations, including whether any officer was
disciplined as a result of the violation.
(d)(l) The Office of the District of Columbia Auditor ("ODCA") shall serve as auditor
of MPD's investigations and preliminary inquiries involving First Amendment activities in order
to assess compliance with this title.
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(2) On an annual basis, the ODCA shall audit MPD files and records relating to
investigations and preliminary inquiries involving First Amendment activities. In conducting the
audit, the ODCA shall review each authorization granted pursuant to sections 205 and 206,
requests for authorization that were denied, and investigative files associated with the
authorizations. The ODCA shall prepare a public report of its audit that shall contain a general
description of the files and records reviewed, and a discussion of any substantive violation of this
title discovered during the audit. A preliminary report of the audit shall be provided by the
ODCA to the Chief of Police for review and comment at least 30 days prior to issuance of a final
audit.
(3) The ODCA shall have access to MPD files and records for purposes of its
audit of investigations and preliminary inquiries involving First Amendment activities.
(4) In discharging its responsibilities, the ODCA shall protect the confidentiality
of MPD files and records.
Sec. 213. Construction.
The provisions of this title are intended to protect persons who are exercising First
Amendment rights in the District of Columbia, and the standards for police conduct set forth in
this title may be relied upon by such persons in any action alleging violations of statutory or
common law rights.
TITLE III. POST-AND-FORFEIT PROCEDURE; DISPLAY OF IDENTIFICATION
BY POLICE OFFICERS.
Sec. 301. Short title.
This title may be cited as the "First Amendment Assembly Enforcement and Procedure
Act of 2004".
Subtitle A.
Sec. 302. Enforcement of the post-and-forfeit procedure.
(a) For the purposes of this section, the term "post-and-forfeit procedure" shall mean the
procedure enforced as part of the criminal justice system in the District of Columbia whereby a
person charged with certain misdemeanors may simultaneously post and forfeit an amount as
collateral (which otherwise would serve as security upon release to ensure the arrestee's
appearance at trial) and thereby obtain a full and final resolution of the criminal charge.
(b) The resolution of a criminal charge using the post-and-forfeit procedure is not a
conviction of a crime and shall not be equated to a criminal conviction. The fact that a person
resolved a charge using the post-and-forfeit procedure may not be relied upon by any court of
the District of Columbia or any agency of the District of Columbia in any subsequent criminal,
civil, or administrative proceeding or administrative action to impose any sanction, penalty,
enhanced sentence, or civil disability.
(c) Whenever the Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD") or the Office of the
Attorney General for the District of Columbia tenders an offer to an arrestee to resolve a
criminal charge using the post-and-forfeit procedure, the offer shall be accompanied with a
written notice provided to the arrestee describing the post-and-forfeit procedure and the
consequences of resolving the criminal charge using this procedure.
(d) The written notice required by subsection (c) of this section shall include, at a
minimum, the following information:
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(1) The identity of the misdemeanor crime that is to be resolved using the postand-forfeit procedure and the amount of collateral that is to be posted and forfeited;
(2) A statement that the arrestee has the right to choose whether to accept the
post-and-forfeit offer or, alternatively, proceed with the criminal case and a potential
adjudication on the merits of the criminal charge;
(3) If the arrestee is in custody, a statement that if the arrestee elects to proceed
with the criminal case he or she may also be eligible for prompt release on citation, or will be
promptly brought to court for determination of bail;
(4) A statement that the resolution of the criminal charge using the post-andforfeit procedure will preclude the arrestee from obtaining an adjudication on the merits of the
criminal charge;
(5) A statement that the resolution of the criminal charge using the post-andforfeit procedure is not a conviction of a crime and may not be equated to a criminal conviction,
and may not result in the imposition of any sanction, penalty, enhanced sentence, or civil
disability by any court of the District of Columbia or any agency of the District of Columbia in
any subsequent criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding or administrative action;
(6) A statement that the agreement to resolve the charge using the post-andforfeit procedure is final after the expiration of 90 days from the date the notice is signed and
that, within the 90-day period, the arrestee or the Office of the Attorney General may file a
motion with the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to set aside the forfeiture and
proceed with the criminal case; and
(7) A statement that, following resolution of the charge using the post-and-forfeit
procedure, the arrestee will continue to have an arrest record for the charge at issue, unless the
arrestee successfllly moves in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to seal his or her
arrest record.
(e) The notice required by subsection (c) of this section shall be offered in the Spanish
language to those persons who require or desire notice in this manner, and shall be offered in
other languages as is reasonable to ensure meaningful access to the notice for persons who are
limited English proficient.
(f) An arrestee provided the written notice required by subsection (c) of this section who
wishes to resolve the criminal charge using the post-and-forfeit procedure shall, after reading the
notice, sign the bottom of the notice, thereby acknowledging the information provided in the
notice and agreeing to accept the offer to resolve the charge using the post-and-forfeit
procedure. After the arrestee signs the notice, the arrestee shall be provided with a copy of the
signed notice.
(g) Within 90 days of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia issuing an updated
bond and collateral list, the Chief of Police shall issue a list of all misdemeanor charges that MPD
members are authorized to resolve using the post-and-forfeit procedure, and the collateral
amount associated with each charge. The Chief shall make the list available to the public,
including placing the list on the MPD website.
(h) The Mayor shall submit an annual public report to the Council identifying the total
amount of money collected the previous year pursuant to the post-and-forfeit procedure and the
number of criminal charges, by specific charge, resolved the previous year using the post-andforfeit procedure. The data shall be reported separately for instances in which the post-andforfeit procedure is independently used by the MPD (without the approval, on a case-by-case
basis, of either the Office of the Attorney General or the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia), and for all other instances in which the post-and-forfeit procedure is used. The
report also shall identify the fund or funds in which the post-and-forfeit moneys were placed.
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Subtitle B.
Sec. 321. Police identifying information.
Every member of the Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD"), while in uniform, shall
wear or display the nameplate and badge issued by the MPD, or the equivalent identification
issued by the MPD, and shall not alter or cover the identifying information or otherwise prevent
or hinder a member of the public from reading the information.
Subtitle C.
Sec. 331. Section 8(a) of the Office of Citizen Complaint Review Establishment Act of
1998, effective March 26, 1999 (D.C. Law 12-208; D.C. Official Code § 5-1107(a)), is amended
as follows:
(a) Paragraph (4) is amended by striking the word "or" at the end.
(b) Paragraph (5) is amended by striking the period at the end and inserting the phrase ";
or" in its place.
(c) A new paragraph (6) is added to read as follows:
Amend
"(6) Failure to wear or display required identification or to identify oneself by
§5_107
name and badge number when requested to do so by a member of the public.".
TITLE IV. FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT; EFFECTIVE DATE.
Sec. 401. Fiscal impact statement.
The Council adopts the fiscal impact statement in the committee report as the fiscal
impact statement required by section 602(c)(3) of the District of Columbia Home Rule Act,
approved December 24, 1973 (87 Stat. 813; D.C. Official Code § 1-206.02(c)(3)).
Sec. 402. Effective date.
This act shall take effect following approval by the Mayor (or in the event of veto by the
Mayor, action by the Council to override the veto), a 30-day period of Congressional review as
provided in section 602(c)(1) of the District of Columbia Home Rule Act, approved December

24, 1973 (87 Stat. 813; D.C. Official Code § 1-206.02(c)(1)), and publication in the District of
Columbia Register.
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